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Abstract 
We address some of the key questions that arise in forecasting the price of crude oil. 
What do applied forecasters need to know about the choice of sample period and about 
the tradeoffs between alternative oil price series and model specifications? Are real or 
nominal oil prices predictable based on macroeconomic aggregates? Does this 
predictability translate into gains in out-of-sample forecast accuracy compared with 
conventional no-change forecasts? How useful are oil futures markets in forecasting the 
price of oil? How useful are survey forecasts? How does one evaluate the sensitivity of a 
baseline oil price forecast to alternative assumptions about future demand and supply 
conditions? How does one quantify risks associated with oil price forecasts? Can joint 
forecasts of the price of oil and of U.S. real GDP growth be improved upon by allowing 
for asymmetries? 
JEL classification: C53, Q43, Q47 
Bank classification: Econometric and statistical methods; International topics 
Résumé 
Les auteurs analysent quelques-unes des grandes questions qui se posent dans la 
prévision du prix du pétrole brut. Que doivent savoir les prévisionnistes quant au choix 
de la période d’observation et aux choix entre différentes séries de prix et spécifications 
de modèle? Les prix réels ou nominaux du pétrole peuvent-ils être prévus à partir des 
agrégats macroéconomiques? Cette prévisibilité se traduit-elle par une précision accrue 
des prévisions hors échantillon par rapport à celles issues d’une marche aléatoire 
classique? Quelle est la valeur prédictive des marchés des contrats à terme sur le pétrole? 
Quelle est l’utilité des enquêtes menées auprès de spécialistes? Comment évaluer la 
sensibilité d’une prévision de référence à diverses hypothèses concernant la demande et 
les conditions d’approvisionnement futures? Comment quantifier les risques associés aux 
prévisions du prix du pétrole? Peut-on améliorer les prévisions conjointes du prix du 
pétrole et de la croissance du PIB réel aux États-Unis en intégrant des asymétries? 
Classification JEL : C53, Q43, Q47 





1.  Introduction 
There is widespread agreement that unexpected large and persistent fluctuations in the real price 
of oil are detrimental to the welfare of both oil-importing and oil-producing economies. Reliable 
forecasts of the price of oil are of interest for a wide range of applications. For example, central 
banks and private sector forecasters view the price of oil as one of the key variables in generating 
macroeconomic projections and in assessing macroeconomic risks. Of particular interest is the 
question of the extent to which the price of oil is helpful in predicting recessions. For example, 
Hamilton (2009), building on the analysis in Edelstein and Kilian (2009), provides evidence that 
the recession of late 2008 was amplified and preceded by an economic slowdown in the 
automobile industry and a deterioration in consumer sentiment. Thus, more accurate forecasts of 
the price of oil have the potential of improving forecast accuracy for a wide range of 
macroeconomic outcomes and of improving macroeconomic policy responses. 
In addition, some sectors of the economy depend directly on forecasts of the price of oil 
for their business. For example, airlines rely on such forecasts in setting airfares, automobile 
companies decide their product menu and product prices with oil price forecasts in mind, and 
utility companies use oil price forecasts in deciding whether to extend capacity or to build new 
plants. Likewise, homeowners rely on oil price forecasts in deciding the timing of their heating 
oil purchases or whether to invest in energy-saving home improvements.  
Finally, forecasts of the price of oil (and the price of its derivatives such as gasoline or 
heating oil) are important in modeling purchases of energy-intensive durables goods such as 
automobiles or home heating systems.
1  They also play a role in generating projections of energy 
use, in modeling investment decisions in the energy sector, in predicting carbon emissions and 
climate change, and in designing regulatory policies such as automotive fuel standards or 
gasoline taxes.
2  
This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the problem of forecasting the price of 
oil. In section 2 we compare alternative measures of the price of crude oil. In section 3 we 
discuss the rationales of alternative specifications of the oil price variable in empirical work. 
Section 4 studies the extent to which the nominal price of oil and the real price of oil are 
predictable based on macroeconomic aggregates. We document strong evidence of predictability 
                                                            
1 See, e.g., Kahn (1986), Davis and Kilian (2010). 
2 See, e.g., Goldberg (1998), Allcott and Wozny (2010), Busse, Knittel and Zettelmeyer (2010), Kellogg (2010). 2 
 
in population. Predictability in population, however, need not translate into out-of-sample  
forecastability. The latter question is the main focus of sections 5 through 8.  
In sections 5, 6 and 7, we compare a wide range of out-of-sample forecasting methods for 
the nominal price of oil. For example, it is common among policymakers to treat the price of oil 
futures contracts as the forecast of the nominal price of oil. We focus on the ability of daily and 
monthly oil futures prices to forecast the nominal price of oil in real time compared with a range 
of simple time series forecasting models. We find some evidence that the price of oil futures has 
additional predictive content compared with the current spot price at the 12-month horizon; the 
magnitude of the reduction in mean-squared prediction error (MSPE) is modest even at the 12-
month horizon, however, and there are indications that this result is sensitive to fairly small 
changes in the sample period and in the forecast horizon. There is no evidence of significant 
forecast accuracy gains at shorter horizons, and at the long horizons of interest to policymakers, 
oil futures prices are clearly inferior to the no-change forecast. 
Similarly, forecasting models based on the dollar exchange rates of major commodity 
exporters, models based on the Hotelling (1931), and a variety of simple time series regression 
models are not successful at significantly lowering the MSPE at short horizons. There is 
evidence, however, that recent percent changes in the nominal price of industrial raw materials 
other than oil can be used to substantially and significantly reduce the MSPE of the no-change 
forecast of the nominal price of oil at horizons of 1 and 3 months. The gains may be as large as 
22% at the 3-month horizon. The predictive success of expert survey forecasts of the nominal 
price of oil proved disappointing. Only the one-quarter-ahead EIA forecast significantly 
improved on the no-change forecast and none of the survey forecasts we studied significantly 
improved on the MSPE of the no-change forecast at the one-year horizon. Finally, at horizons of 
several years, forecasts based on adjusting the current spot price for survey inflation expectations 
systematically outperform the no-change forecast by a wide margin. At intermediate horizons, 
none of these alternative forecasting approaches outperforms the no-change forecast of the 
nominal price of oil. 
The best econometric forecast need not coincide with the price expectations of market 
participants. The latter expectations data are rarely observed with the exception of data in the 
Michigan consumer survey on gasoline price expectations. We evaluate this survey forecast of 
the nominal retail price of gasoline against the no-change forecast benchmark. We also contrast 3 
 
this survey forecast with the price of the corresponding futures contracts. Following Anderson, 
Kellogg and Sallee (2010), we document that, after controlling for inflation, long-term household 
gasoline price expectations are well approximated by a random walk. This finding has immediate 
implications for modeling purchases of energy-intensive consumer durables.  
Although the nominal price of crude oil receives much attention in the press, the variable 
most relevant for economic modeling is the real price of oil. Section 8 compares alternative 
forecasting models for the real price of oil. We provide evidence that reduced-form 
autoregressive and vector autoregressive models of the global oil market are more accurate than 
the random walk forecast of the real price of oil at short horizons. Even after taking account of 
the constraints on the real-time availability of predictors, the MSPE reductions can be substantial 
in the short run. These gains tend to diminish at longer horizons, however, and, beyond one or 
two years, the no-change forecast of the real price of oil is the predictor with the lowest MSPE in 
general. Moreover, the extent of these MSPE reductions depends on the definition of the oil price 
series.  
An important limitation of reduced-form forecasting models from a policy point of view 
is that they provide no insight into what is driving the forecast and do not allow the policymaker 
to explore alternative hypothetical forecast scenarios. In section 9, we illustrate how recently 
developed structural vector autoregressive models of the global oil market may be used to 
generate conditional projections of how the oil price forecast would deviate from the 
unconditional forecast benchmark, given alternative scenarios such as a surge in speculative 
demand similar to previous historical episodes, a resurgence of the global business cycle, or 
increased U.S. oil production.  
  Much of the work on forecasting the price of oil has focused on the dollar price of oil. 
This is natural because crude oil is typically traded in U.S. dollars, but there also is considerable 
interest in forecasting the real price of oil faced by other oil-importing countries such as the Euro 
area, Canada, or Japan.  In section 10, we discuss the changes required in forecasting the real 
price of oil in that case and show that accurate forecasts may require different forecasting models 
for different countries, given the important role of exchange rate fluctuations. 
Section 11 focuses on the problem of jointly forecasting U.S. macroeconomic aggregates 
such as real GDP growth and the price of oil. Of particular interest is the forecasting ability of 
nonlinear transformations of the price of oil such as the nominal net oil price increase or the real 4 
 
net oil price increase. The net oil price increase is a censored predictor that assigns zero weight 
to net oil price decreases.  There is little evidence that this type of asymmetry is reflected in the 
responses of U.S. real GDP to innovations in the real price of oil, as documented in Kilian and 
Vigfusson (2010a,b), but Hamilton (2010) suggests that the net oil price increase specification is 
best thought of as a parsimonious forecasting device. We provide a comprehensive analysis of 
this conjecture. 
Point forecasts of the price of oil are important, but they fail to convey the large 
uncertainty associated with oil price forecasts. That uncertainty is captured by the predictive 
density.  In section 12 we discuss various approaches of conveying the information in the 
predictive density including measures of price volatility and of tail conditional expectations with 
particular emphasis on defining appropriate risk measures. Section 13 contains a discussion of 
directions for future research. The concluding remarks are in section 14. 
 
2. Alternative Oil Price Measures 
Figure 1 plots alternative measures of the nominal price of oil. The longest available series is the 
West Texas Intermediate (WTI) price of crude oil. Data on U.S. refiners’ acquisition cost for 
domestically produced oil, for imported crude oil and for a composite of these series are 
available starting in 1974.1. Figure 1 highlights striking differences in the time series process for 
the price of oil prior to 1973 and after 1973. The WTI data until 1973 tend to exhibit a pattern 
resembling a step-function. The price remains constant for extended periods, followed by 
discrete adjustments. The U.S. wholesale price of oil for 1948-1972 used in Hamilton (1983) is 
numerically identical with this WTI series. As discussed in Hamilton (1983, 1985) the discrete 
pattern of crude oil price changes during this period is explained by the specific regulatory 
structure of the oil industry during 1948-72. Each month the Texas Railroad Commission and 
other U.S. state regulatory agencies would forecast demand for oil for the subsequent month and 
would set the allowable production levels for wells in the state to meet demand. As a result, 
much of the cyclically endogenous component of oil demand was reflected in shifts in quantities 
rather than prices. The commission was generally unable or unwilling to accommodate sudden 
disruptions in oil production, preferring instead to exploit these events to implement sometimes 
dramatic price increases (Hamilton 1983, p. 230). 
  Whereas the WTI price is a good proxy for the U.S. price for oil during 1948-72, when  5 
 
the U.S. was largely self-sufficient in oil, it becomes less representative after 1973, when the 
share of U.S. imports of oil rapidly expanded. The price discrepancy between unregulated 
foreign oil and regulated domestic oil created increasing pressure to deregulate the domestic 
market. As regulatory control weakened in the mid-1970s, adjustments to the WTI price became 
much more frequent and smaller in magnitude, as shown in the right panel of Figure 1. By the 
mid-1980s, the WTI had been deregulated to the point that there was strong comovement 
between all three oil price series most of the time. 
  Figure 2 shows the corresponding oil price data adjusted for U.S. CPI inflation. The left 
panel reveals that in real terms the price of oil had been falling considerably since the late 1950s. 
That decline was corrected only by the sharp rise in the real price of oil in 1973/74. There has 
been no pronounced trend in the real price of oil since 1974, but considerable volatility. The 
definition of the real price of oil is of lesser importance after 1986. Prior to 1986, one key 
difference is that the refiners’ acquisition cost for imported crude oil fell in 1974-76, whereas the 
real WTI price rose. A second key difference is that the real WTI price spiked in 1980, whereas 
the real price of oil imports remained largely stable. That pattern was only reversed with the 
outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in late 1980. 
  Figure 3 once more highlights the striking differences between the pre- and post-1973 
period. It shows the percent growth rate of the real price of oil. A major structural change in the 
distribution of the price of oil in late 1973 is readily apparent.
3 Whereas the pre-1973 period is 
characterized by long periods of low volatility interrupted by infrequent large positive price 
spikes, the post-1973 period is characterized by high month-to-month volatility. It has been 
suggested that perhaps this volatility has increased systematically after the collapse of OPEC in 
late 1985. The answer is somewhat sensitive to the exact choice of dates. If one were to date the 
OPEC period as 1973.10-1985.12, for example, there is no evidence of an increase in the 
variance of the percent change in the real WTI price of oil. The volatility in the OPEC period is 
virtually identical to that in the post-OPEC period of 1986.1-2010.6. Shifting the starting date of 
the OPEC period to 1974.1, in contrast, implies a considerable increase in volatility after 1985. 
Extending the ending date of the OPEC period to include the price collapse in 1986 induced by 
                                                            
3 In related work, Dvir and Rogoff (2010) present formal evidence of a structural break in the process driving the 
annual real price of oil in 1973. Given this evidence of instability, combining pre- and post-1973 real oil price data 
is not a valid option. 
 6 
 
OPEC actions, which seems reasonable, on the other hand, renders the volatility much more 
similar across subperiods. Finally, combining the earlier starting date and the later ending date, 
there is evidence of a reduction in the real price volatility after the collapse of OPEC rather than 
an increase. Below we therefore treat the post-1973 data as homogeneous.  
  Which price series is more appropriate for the analysis of post-1973 data depends in part 
on the purpose of the study. The WTI price data (as well as other measures of the domestic U.S. 
price of oil) are questionable to the extent that these prices were regulated until the mid-1980s 
and do not reflect the true scarcity of oil or the price actually paid by U.S. refiners. The refiners’ 
acquisition cost for imported crude oil provides a good proxy for oil price fluctuations in global 
oil markets, but may not be representative for the price that U.S. refineries paid for crude oil. The 
latter price may be captured better by a composite of the acquisition cost of domestic and 
imported crude oil, neither of which, however, is available before January 1974.  The real price 
of oil imports, nevertheless, is the price relevant for theories interpreting oil price shocks as 
terms-of-trade shocks. Theories that interpret oil price shocks as allocative disturbances, on the 
other hand, require the use of retail energy prices, for which the composite refiners’ acquisition 
cost may be a proxy. Below we will consider several alternative oil price series.
4 
 
3. Alternative Oil Price Specifications 
Although an increasing number of empirical studies of the post-1973 data focuses on the real 
price of oil, many other studies have relied on the nominal price of oil.  One argument for the use 
of nominal oil prices has been that the nominal price of oil – unlike the real price of oil – is 
exogenous with respect to U.S. macroeconomic conditions and hence linearly unpredictable on 
the basis of lagged U.S. macroeconomic conditions.
5 This argument may have some merit for the 
pre-1973 period, but is implausible for the post-1973 period. If the U.S. money supply 
unexpectedly doubles, for example, then, according to standard macroeconomic models, so will 
all nominal prices denominated in dollars (including the nominal price of oil), leaving the 
relative price or real price of crude oil unaffected (see Gillman and Nakov 2009). Clearly, one 
would not want to interpret such an episode as an oil price shock involving a doubling of the 
                                                            
4 For further discussion of the trade-offs between alternative oil price definitions from an economic point of view 
see Kilian and Vigfusson (2010b). 
5 For a review of the relationship between the concepts of (strict) exogeneity and predictability in linear models see 
Cooley and LeRoy (1985). 7 
 
nominal price of oil. Indeed, economic models of the impact of the price of oil on the U.S. 
economy correctly predict that such a nominal oil price shock should have no effect on the U.S. 
economy because theoretical models inevitably are specified in terms of the real price of oil, 
which has not changed in this example. 
  Another argument in the literature has been that the nominal price of oil can be 
considered exogenous after 1973 because it is set by OPEC. This interpretation is without basis. 
First, there is little evidence to support the notion that OPEC has been successfully acting as a 
cartel in the 1970s and early 1980s, and the role of OPEC has diminished further since 1986 (see, 
e.g., Skeet 1988; Smith 2005; Almoguera, Douglas and Herrera 2010). Second, even if we were 
to accept the notion that an OPEC cartel sets the nominal price of oil, economic theory predicts 
that this cartel price will endogenously respond to U.S. macroeconomic conditions. This 
theoretical prediction is consistent with anecdotal evidence of OPEC oil producers raising the 
price of oil (or equivalently lowering oil production) in response to unanticipated U.S. inflation, 
low U.S. interest rates and the depreciation of the dollar. Moreover, as observed by Barsky and 
Kilian (2002), economic theory predicts that the strength of the oil cartel itself (measured by the 
extent to which individual cartel members choose to deviate from cartel guidelines) will be 
positively related to the state of the global business cycle (see Green and Porter 1984). Thus, 
both nominal and real oil prices must be considered endogenous with respect to the global 
economy, unless proven otherwise.  
A third and distinct argument has been that consumers of refined oil products choose to 
respond to changes in the nominal price of oil rather than the real price of oil, perhaps because 
the nominal price of oil is more visible. In other words, consumers suffer from money illusion. 
There is no direct empirical evidence in favor of this behavioral argument at the micro level. 
Rather the case for this specification, if there is one, has to be based on the predictive success of 
such models; a success that, however, has yet to be demonstrated empirically. We will address 
this question in section 11.  
  Even proponents of using the nominal price in empirical models of the transmission of oil 
price shocks have concluded that there is no stable dynamic relationship between percent 
changes in the nominal price of oil and in U.S. macroeconomic aggregates. There is evidence 
from in-sample fitting exercises, however, of a predictive relationship between suitable nonlinear 
transformations of the nominal price of oil and U.S. real output, in particular. The most 8 
 
successful of these transformations is the net oil price increase measure of Hamilton (1996, 
2003). Let  t s  denote the nominal price of oil in logs and the difference operator. Then the net 
oil price increase is defined as: 
,* max 0, ,
net
tt t ss s
         
where
*
t s  is the highest oil price in the preceding 12 months or, alternatively, the preceding 36  
months. This transformation involves two distinct ideas. One is that consumers in oil-importing 
economies respond to increases in the price of oil only if the increase is large relative to the 
recent past. If correct, the same logic by construction should apply to decreases in the price of 
oil, suggesting a net change transformation that is symmetric in increases and decreases.  
The second idea implicit in Hamilton’s definition is that consumers do not respond to net 
decreases in the price of oil, allowing us to omit the net decreases from the model. In other 
words, consumers respond asymmetrically to net oil price increases and net oil price decreases 
and they do so in a very specific fashion. Although there are theoretical models that imply the 
existence of an asymmetry in the response of the economy to oil price increases and decreases, 
these models do not imply the specific nonlinear structure embodied in the net increase measure 
nor do they imply that the net decrease measure should receive zero weight. Nevertheless, 
Hamilton’s nominal net oil price increase variable has become one of the leading specifications 
in the literature on predictive relationships between the price of oil and the U.S. economy. 
Hamilton (2010), for example, interprets this specification as capturing nonlinear changes in 
consumer sentiment in response to nominal oil price increases.
6  
As with other oil price specifications there is reason to expect lagged feedback from 
global macroeconomic aggregates to the net oil price increase. Whereas Hamilton (2003) made 
the case that net oil price increases in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s were capturing exogenous 
events in the Middle East, Hamilton (2009) concedes that the net oil price increase of 2003-08 
was driven in large part by a surge in the demand for oil. Kilian (2009a,b; 2010), on the other 
hand, provides evidence based on structural VAR models that in fact most net oil price increases 
have contained a large demand component driven by global macroeconomic conditions, even 
                                                            
6 Interestingly, the behavioral rationale for the net oil price increase measure applies equally to the nominal price of 
oil and the real price of oil. Although Hamilton (2003) applied this transformation to the nominal price of oil, 
several other studies have recently explored models that apply the same transformation to the real price of oil (see, 
e.g., Kilian and Vigfusson 2010a; Herrera, Lagalo and Wada 2010). 9 
 
prior to 2003. This finding is also consistent with the empirical results in Baumeister and 
Peersman (2010).  
For now we set aside all nonlinear transformations of the price of oil and focus on linear 
forecasting models for the nominal price of oil and for the real price of oil. Nonlinear joint 
forecasting models for U.S. real GDP and the price of oil based on net oil price increases are 
discussed in section 11. 
 
4. Granger Causality Tests 
Much of the existing work on predicting the price of oil has focused on testing for the existence 
of a predictive relationship from macroeconomic aggregates to the price of oil. The existence of 
predictability in population is a necessary precondition for out-of-sample forecastability (see 
Inoue and Kilian 2004a). Within the linear VAR framework the absence of predictability from 
one variable to another in population may be tested using Granger non-causality tests. 
 
4.1. Nominal Oil Price Predictability 
4.1.1. The Pre-1973 Evidence 
Granger causality from macroeconomic aggregates to the price of oil has received attention in 
part because Granger non-causality is one of the testable implications of strict exogeneity. The 
notion that the percent change in the nominal price of oil may be considered exogenous with 
respect to the U.S. economy was bolstered by evidence in Hamilton (1983), who observed that 
there is no apparent Granger causality from U.S. domestic macroeconomic aggregates to the 
percent change in the nominal price of oil during 1948-1972. Of course, the absence of Granger 
causality is merely a necessary condition for strict exogeneity. Moreover, a failure to reject the 
null of no Granger causality is at best suggestive; it does not establish the validity of the null 
hypothesis. Hamilton’s case for the exogeneity of the nominal price of oil with respect to the 
U.S. economy therefore rested primarily on the unique institutional features of the oil market 
during this period, discussed in section 2, and on historical evidence that unexpected supply 
disruptions under this institutional regime appear to be associated with exogenous political 
events in the Middle East, allowing us to treat the resulting price spikes as exogenous with 
respect to the U.S. economy. For a more nuanced view of these historical episodes see Kilian 
(2008b; 2009a,b; 2010). Even if we accept Hamilton’s interpretation of the pre-1973 period, the 10 
 
institutional conditions that Hamilton (1983) appeals to ceased to exist in the early 1970s, and 
Hamilton’s results for the 1948-1972 period are mainly of historical interest. The real question 
for our purposes is to what extent there is evidence that oil prices can be predicted from 
macroeconomic aggregates in the post-1973 period. 
 
4.1.2. The Post-1973 Evidence 
There is widespread agreement among oil economists that, starting in 1973, nominal oil prices 
must be considered endogenous with respect to U.S. macroeconomic variables (see Kilian 
2008a). Whether this endogeneity makes the nominal price of oil predictable on the basis of 
lagged U.S. macroeconomic aggregates depends on whether the price of oil behaves like a 
typical asset price or not. In the former case, one would expect the nominal price of oil to 
incorporate information about expected U.S. macroeconomic conditions immediately, rendering 
the nominal price of oil linearly unpredictable on the basis of lagged U.S. macroeconomic 
aggregates. This line of reasoning is familiar from the analysis of stock and bond prices as well 
as exchange rates.
7 In the latter case, the endogeneity of the nominal price of oil with respect to 
the U.S. economy implies that lagged changes in U.S. macroeconomic aggregates have 
predictive power for the nominal price of oil in the post-1973 data (see, e.g., Cooley and LeRoy 
1985). 
  A recent study by Kilian and Vega (2010) helps resolve the question of which 
interpretation is more appropriate. Kilian and Vega find no evidence of systematic feedback from 
news about a wide range of U.S. macroeconomic aggregates to the nominal price of oil within a 
month. This lack of evidence is in sharp contrast to the evidence for typical asset prices, so lack 
of power cannot explain the absence of significant feedback from U.S. macroeconomic news to 
the nominal price of oil. These two results in conjunction allow us to rule out the pure asset price 
interpretation of the nominal price of oil. We conclude that, if the nominal price of oil is 
endogenous with respect to lagged U.S. macroeconomic aggregates, then these macroeconomic 
aggregates must have predictive power at least in population. 
  Predictability in the context of linear vector autoregressions may be tested using Granger 
causality tests.  Table 1a investigates the evidence of Granger causality from selected nominal 
U.S. macroeconomic variables to the nominal price of oil. All results are based on pairwise 
vector autoregressions. The lag order is fixed at 12. Similar results would have been obtained 
                                                            
7 Hamilton (1994, p. 306) illustrates this point in the context of a model of stock prices and expected dividends.  11 
 
with 24 lags. We consider four alternative nominal oil price series. The evaluation period is 
alternatively 1973.1-2009.12 or 1975.1-2009.12.
8  It is not clear a priori which oil price series is 
best suited for finding predictability. On the one hand, one would expect the evidence of 
predictability to be stronger for oil price series that are unregulated (such as the refiners’ 
acquisition cost for imported crude oil) than for partially regulated domestic price series. On the 
other hand, to the extent that the 1973/74 oil price shock episode was driven by monetary factors, 
as proposed by Barsky and Kilian (2002), one would expect stronger evidence in favor of such 
feedback from the WTI price series that includes this episode.  
  There are several reasons to expect the dollar-denominated nominal price of oil to 
respond to changes in nominal U.S. macroeconomic aggregates. One channel of transmission is 
purely monetary and operates through U.S. inflation.  For example, Gillman and Nakov (2009) 
stress that changes in the nominal price of oil must occur in equilibrium just to offset persistent 
shifts in U.S. inflation, given that the price of oil is denominated in dollars. Indeed, the Granger 
causality tests in Table 1a indicate highly significant lagged feedback from U.S. headline CPI 
inflation to the percent change in the nominal WTI price of oil for the full sample, consistent 
with the findings in Gillman and Nakov (2009). The evidence for the other oil price series is 
somewhat weaker with the exception of the refiners’ acquisition cost for imported crude oil, but 
that result may simply reflect a loss of power when the sample size is shortened.
9 
Gillman and Nakov view changes in inflation in the post-1973 period as rooted in 
persistent changes in the growth rate of money.
10 Thus, an alternative approach of testing the 
hypothesis of Gillman and Nakov (2009) is to focus on Granger causality from monetary 
aggregates to the nominal price of oil. Given the general instability in the link from changes in 
monetary aggregates to inflation, one would not necessarily expect changes in monetary 
aggregates to have much predictive power for the price of oil, except perhaps in the 1970s (see 
Barsky and Kilian 2002). Table 1a nevertheless shows that there is considerable lagged feedback 
                                                            
8 In the former case, the pre-1974.1 observations are only used as pre-sample observations. 
9 It can be shown that similar results hold for the CPI excluding energy, albeit not for the CPI excluding food and 
energy. 
10 For an earlier exposition of the role of monetary factors in determining the price of oil see Barsky and Kilian 
(2002). Both Barsky and Kilian (2002) and Gillman and Nakov (2009) view the shifts in U.S. inflation in the early 
1970s as caused by persistent changes in the growth rate of the money supply, but there are important differences in 
emphasis. Whereas Barsky and Kilian stress the real effects of unanticipated monetary expansions on real domestic 
output, on the demand for oil and hence on the real price of oil, Gillman and Nakov stress that the relative price of 
oil must not decline in response to a monetary expansion, necessitating a higher nominal price of oil, consistent with 
anecdotal evidence on OPEC price decisions (see, e.g., Kilian 2008b). These two explanations are complementary. 12 
 
from narrow measures of money such as M1 for the refiners’ acquisition cost and the WTI price 
of oil based on the 1975.2-2009.12 evaluation period. The much weaker evidence for the full 
WTI series may reflect the stronger effect of regulatory policies on the WTI price during the 
early 1970s. The evidence for broader monetary aggregates such as M2 having predictive power  
for the nominal price of oil is much weaker, with only one test statistically significant. 
A third approach to testing for a role for U.S. monetary conditions relies on the fact that  
rising dollar-denominated non-oil commodity prices are thought to presage rising U.S. inflation. 
To the extent that oil price adjustments are more sluggish than adjustments in other industrial 
commodity prices, one would expect changes in nominal Commodity Research Bureau (CRB) 
spot prices to Granger cause changes in the nominal price of oil. Indeed, Table 1a indicates 
highly statistically significant lagged feedback from CRB sub-indices for industrial raw materials 
and for metals. 
In contrast, neither short-term interest rates nor trade-weighted exchange rates have 
significant predictive power for the nominal price of oil. According to the Hotelling model, one 
would expect the nominal price of oil to grow at the nominal rate of interest, providing yet 
another link from U.S. macroeconomic aggregates to the nominal price of oil. Table 1a, 
however, shows no evidence of statistically significant feedback from the 3-month T-Bill rate to 
the price of oil. This finding is not surprising as the price of oil clearly was not growing at the 
rate of interest even approximately (see Figure 1). Nor is there evidence of significant feedback 
from lagged changes in the trade-weighted nominal U.S. exchange rate. This does not mean that 
all bilateral exchange rates lack predictive power. In related work, Chen, Rossi and Rogoff 
(2010) show that the floating exchange rates of small commodity exporters (including Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, South Africa and Chile) with respect to the dollar have remarkably robust 
forecasting power for global prices of their commodity exports. The explanation is that these 
exchange rates are forward looking and embody information about future movements in 
commodity export markets that cannot easily be captured by other means.  
Although Chen et al.’s analysis cannot be extended to oil exporters such as Saudi Arabia 
because Saudi Arabia’s exchange rate has not been floating freely, the bilateral dollar exchange 
rates of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa may serve as a proxy for expected 
broad-based movements in industrial commodity prices that may also be helpful in predicting 
changes in the nominal price of oil. According to Chen et al., the share of nonagricultural 13 
 
commodity exports is largest in South Africa, followed by Australia, Canada and New Zealand. 
In general, the larger the share of nonagricultural exports, the higher one would expect the 
predictive power for industrial commodities to be. For the price of oil, the share of energy 
exports such as crude oil, coal and natural gas may be an even better indicator of predictive 
power, suggesting that Canada should have the highest predictive power for the price of oil, 
followed by Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand. Table 1b shows strong evidence of 
predictability for all bilateral exchange rates but that of New Zealand, consistent with this 
intuition.  Moreover, when using the dollar exchange rate of the Japanese Yen and of the British 
Pound as a control group, there is no significant evidence of Granger causality from exchange 
rates to the price of oil.
11 The results in Table 1b are also very much in line with the direct 
evidence of predictive power from nonagricultural commodity price indices in Table 1a.  
 
4.1.3. Reconciling the Pre- and Post-1973 Evidence on Predictability 
Tables 1a and 1b suggest that indicators of U.S. inflation have significant predictive power for 
the nominal price of oil. This result is in striking contrast to the pre-1973 period. As shown in 
Hamilton (1983) using quarterly data and in Gillman and Nakov (2009) using monthly data, 
there is no significant Granger causality from U.S. inflation to the percent change in the nominal 
price of oil in the 1950s and 1960s.  This difference in results is suggestive of a structural break 
in late 1973 in the predictive relationship between the price of oil and the U.S. economy.  
  One reason that the pre-1973 predictive regressions differ from the post-1973 regressions 
is that prior to 1973 the nominal price of oil was adjusted only at discrete intervals (see Figure 
1). Because the nominal oil price data was generated by a discrete-continuous choice model, 
conventional vector autoregressions by construction are not appropriate for testing predictability. 
One way of illustrating this problem is by fitting a random walk model with drift to these data 
and plotting randomly generated draws from the fitted model against the actual data. Figure 4 
shows one such sequence. Without loss of generality, Figure 4 illustrates that the fitted time 
series model model – like any conventional time series model – is unable to replicate the 
discontinuous adjustment process underlying the pre-1973 WTI data. This is true even allowing 
for leptokurtic error distributions. In other words, autoregressive or moving average time series 
processes are inappropriate for these data and tests based on such models have to be viewed with 
                                                            
11 Although the U.K. has been exporting crude oil starting in the late 1970s, its share of petroleum exports is too low 
to consider the U.K. a commodity exporter (see Kilian, Rebucci and Spatafora 2009). 14 
 
caution.  
This problem with the pre-1973 data may be ameliorated by deflating the nominal price 
of oil, which renders the oil price data continuous and more amenable to VAR analysis (see 
Figure 2). Additional problems arise, however, when combining oil price data generated by a 
discrete-continuous choice process with data from the post-Texas Railroad Commission era that 
are fully continuous. Concern over low power has prompted many applied researchers to 
combine oil price data for the pre-1973 and post-1973 period in the same model when studying 
the predictive relationship from macroeconomic aggregates to the price of oil. This approach is 
obviously inadvisable when dealing with nominal oil price data, as already discussed. Perhaps 
less obviously, this approach is equally unappealing when dealing with vector autoregressions 
involving the real price of oil. The problem that the nature and speed of the feedback from U.S. 
macroeconomic aggregates to the real price of oil differs by construction, depending on whether 
the nominal price of oil is temporarily fixed or not. This instability manifests itself in a structural 
break in the predictive regressions commonly used to test for lagged potentially nonlinear 
feedback from the real of price of oil to real GDP growth (see, e.g., Balke, Brown and Yücel 
2002). The p-value for the null hypothesis that there is no break in 1973.Q4 in the coefficients of 
this predictive regression is 0.001 (see Kilian and Vigfusson 2010b).
12 For that reason, regression 
estimates of the relationship between the real price of oil and domestic macroeconomic 
aggregates obtained from the entire post-war period are not informative about the strength of 
these relationships in post-1973 data.
13 In the analysis of the real price of oil below we therefore 
restrict the evaluation period to start no earlier than 1973.1. 
 
4.2. Real Oil Price Predictability in the Post-1973 Period 
It is well established in natural resource theory that the real price of oil increases in response to 
low expected real interest rates and in response to high real aggregate output.
14 Any analysis of 
the role of expected real interest rates is complicated by the fact that inflation expectations are 
                                                            
12 Even allowing for the possibility of data mining, this break remains statistically significant at the 5% level. 
13 This situation is analogous to that of combining real exchange rate data for the pre- and post-Bretton Woods 
periods in studying the speed of mean reversion toward purchasing power parity. Clearly, the speed of adjustment 
toward purchasing power parity will differ if one of the adjustment channels is shut down, as was the case under the 
fixed exchange rate system, than when both prices and exchange rates are free to adjust as was the case under the 
floating rate system. Thus, regressions on long time spans of real exchange rate data produce average estimates that 
by construction are not informative about the speed of adjustment in the Bretton Woods system. 
14 For a review of this literature see Barsky and Kilian (2002). 15 
 
difficult to pin down, especially at longer horizons, and that the relevant horizon for resource 
extraction is not clear. We therefore focus on the predictive power of fluctuations in real 
aggregate output. Table 2 reports p-values for tests of the hypothesis of Granger non-causality  
from selected measures of real aggregate output to the real price of oil.   
A natural starting point is U.S. real GDP.  Economic theory implies that U.S. real GDP 
and the real price of oil are mutually endogenous and determined jointly. For example, one 
would expect an unexpected increase in U.S. real GDP, all else equal, to increase the flow 
demand for crude oil and hence the real price of oil. Unless the real price of oil is forward 
looking and already embodies all information about future U.S. real GDP, a reasonable 
conjecture therefore is that lagged U.S. real GDP should help predict the real price of oil. Recent 
research by Kilian and Murphy (2010) has shown that the real price of oil indeed contains an 
asset price component, but that this component most of the time explains only a small fraction of 
the historical variation in the real price of oil. Thus, we would expect fluctuations in U.S. real 
GDP to predict the real price of oil at least in population. Under the assumption that the joint 
process can be approximated by a linear vector autoregression, this implies the existence of 
Granger causality from U.S. real GDP to the real price of oil  
Notwithstanding this presumption, Table 2 indicates no evidence of Granger causality 
from U.S. real GDP growth to the real price of oil. This finding is robust to alternative methods 
of detrending and alternative lag orders.  In the absence of instantaneous feedback from U.S. real 
GDP to the real price of oil, a finding of Granger noncausality from U.S. real GDP to the real 
price of oil – in conjunction with evidence that the real price of oil Granger causes U.S. real GDP 
– would be consistent with the real price of oil being strictly exogenous with respect to U.S. real 
GDP. It can be shown, however, that the evidence of Granger causality from the real price of oil 
to U.S. real GDP is not much stronger.  When linear detrending (LT), Hodrick-Prescott-filtering 
(HP) and log-differencing (DIF) the data, which each transformation applied symmetrically to 
both time series in a bivariate VAR(4) model, there is only one marginal rejection at the 10% 
level.  This rejection occurs for the real WTI price in differences when evaluated on the 1973.I-
2009.IV period. There are no rejections using other data transformations or shorter evaluation 
periods. The fact that there are few rejections, if any, in either direction suggests that the Granger 
noncausality test may simply lack power for samples of this length. In fact, this is precisely the 
argument that prompted some researchers to combine data from the pre-1973 and post-1973 16 
 
period – a strategy that we do not recommend for the reasons discussed in section 4.1.3.  
Another likely explanation of the failure to reject the null of no predictability is model 
misspecification. It is well known that Granger causality in a bivariate model may be due to an 
omitted third variable, but equally relevant is the possibility of Granger noncausality in a 
bivariate model arising from omitted variables (see Lütkepohl 1982). This possibility is more 
than a theoretical curiosity in our context.  Recent models of the determination of the real price 
of oil after 1973 have stressed that this price is determined in global markets (see, e.g., Kilian 
2009a; Kilian and Murphy 2010).  In particular, the demand for oil depends not merely on U.S. 
demand, but on global demand. The bivariate model for the real price of oil and U.S. real GDP 
by construction omits fluctuations in real GDP in the rest of the world. The relevance of this 
point is that offsetting movements in real GDP abroad can easily offset the effect of changes in 
U.S. real GDP, obscuring the dynamic relationship of interest and lowering the power of the 
Granger causality test. Only when real GDP fluctuations are highly correlated across countries 
would we expect U.S. real GDP to be a good proxy for world real GDP.
15  In addition, as the 
U.S. share in world GDP evolves, by construction so do the predictive correlations underlying 
Table 2. In this regard, Kilian and Hicks (2010) have documented dramatic changes in the PPP-
adjusted share in GDP of the major industrialized economies and of the main emerging 
economies in recent years that cast further doubt on the U.S. real GDP results in Table 2. For 
example, today, China and India combined have almost as high a share in world GDP as the 
United States.  
A closely related third point is that fluctuations in real GDP are a poor proxy for 
business-cycle driven fluctuations in the demand for oil. It is well known, for example, that in 
recent decades the share of services in U.S. real GDP has greatly expanded at the cost of 
manufacturing and other sectors. Clearly, real GDP growth driven by the non-service sector will 
be associated with disproportionately higher demand for oil and other industrial commodities 
than real GDP growth in the service sector. This provides one more reason why one would not 
expect a strong or stable predictive relationship between U.S. real GDP and the real price of oil.   
                                                            
15 For example, the conjunction of rising growth in emerging Asia with unchanged growth in the U.S. all else equal 
would cause world GDP growth and hence the real price of oil to increase, but would imply a zero correlation 
between U.S. real GDP growth and changes in the real price of oil. Alternatively, slowing growth in Japan and 
Europe may offset rising growth in the U.S., keeping the real price of oil stable and implying a zero correlation of 
U.S. growth with changes in the real price of oil. This does not mean that there is no feedback from lagged U.S. real 
GDP. Indeed, with lower U.S. growth the increase in the real price of oil would have slowed in the first example and 
without offsetting U.S. growth the real price of oil would have dropped in the second example. 17 
 
An alternative quarterly predictor that partially addresses these last two concerns is 
quarterly world industrial production from the U.N. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. This series has 
recently been introduced by Baumeister and Peersman (2010) in the context of modeling the 
demand for oil. Although there are serious methodological concerns regarding the construction 
of any such index, as discussed in Beyer, Doornik and Hendry (2001), one would expect this 
series to be a better proxy for global fluctuations in the demand for crude oil than U.S. real GDP.  
Indeed, Table 2 shows strong evidence of Granger causality from world industrial production to 
the real WTI price in the full sample period for the LT model. For the four shorter series there 
are three additional rejections for the LT model; the other p-value is not much higher than 0.1. 
The reduction in p-values compared with U.S. real GDP is dramatic. The fact that there is 
evidence of predictability only for the linearly detrended series makes sense. As discussed in 
Kilian (2009b), the demand for industrial commodities such as crude oil is subject to long 
swings. Detrending methods such as HP filtering (and even more so first differencing) eliminate 
much of this low frequency covariation in the data, removing the feature of the data we are 
interested in testing. 
Additional insights may be gained by focusing on monthly rather than quarterly 
predictors. The first contender in Table 3 is the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI). 
This is a broad measure of monthly real economic activity in the United States obtained from 
applying principal component analysis to a wide range of monthly indicators of real activity 
expressed in growth rates (see Stock and Watson 1999). As in the case of quarterly U.S. real 
GDP, there is no evidence of Granger causality. If we rely on U.S. industrial production as the 
predictor, there is weak evidence of feedback to the domestic price of oil for the LT model. For 
other measures of the real price of oil, none of the test statistics is significant, although we again 
note the sharp drop in p-values as we replace the CFNAI by industrial production. 
There are no monthly data on world industrial production, but the OECD provides an 
industrial production index for OECD economies and six selected non-OECD countries. As 
expected, the rejections of Granger noncausality become much stronger when we focus on 
OECD+6 industrial production. Table 3 indicates strong and systematic Granger causality, 
especially for the LT specification. Even OECD+6 industrial production, however, is an 
imperfect proxy for business-cycle driven fluctuations in the global demand for industrial 
commodities such as crude oil. 18 
 
One alternative is the index of global real activity recently proposed in Kilian (2009a). 
This index does not rely on any country weights and has truly global coverage. It has been 
constructed with the explicit purpose of measuring fluctuations in the broad-based demand for 
industrial commodities associated with the global business cycle.
16 As expected, the last row of 
Table 3 indicates even stronger evidence of Granger causality from this index to the real price of 
oil, regardless of the definition of the real price of oil. It also highlights a fourth issue. There is 
evidence that allowing for two years worth of lags rather than one year often strengthens the 
significance of the rejections. This finding mirrors the point made in Hamilton and Herrera 
(2004) that it is essential to allow for a rich lag structure in studying the dynamic relationship 
between the economy and the price of oil. 
Although none of the proxies for global fluctuations in demand is without limitations, we 
conclude that there is a robust pattern of Granger causality, as we correct for problems of model 
misspecification and of data mismeasurement that undermine the power of the test. This 
conclusion is further strengthened by evidence in Kilian and Hicks (2010) based on distributed 
lag models that revisions to professional real GDP growth forecasts have significant predictive 
power for the real price of oil during 2000.11-2008.12 after weighting each country’s forecast 
revision by its PPP-GDP share. Predictability in population, of course, does not necessarily 
imply out-of-sample forecastability (see Inoue and Kilian 2004a). The next two sections 
therefore examine alternative approaches to forecasting the nominal and the real price of oil out-
of-sample.  
 
5. Short-Horizon Forecasts of the Nominal Price of Oil 
The most common approach to forecasting the nominal price of oil is to treat the price of the oil  
                                                            
16 This index is constructed from ocean shipping freight rates. The idea of using fluctuations in shipping freight rates 
as indicators of shifts in the global real activity dates back to Isserlis (1938) and Tinbergen (1959). The panel of 
monthly freight-rate data underlying the global real activity index was collected manually from Drewry’s Shipping 
Monthly using various issues since 1970. The data set is restricted to dry cargo rates. The earliest raw data are 
indices of iron ore, coal and grain shipping rates compiled by Drewry’s. The remaining series are differentiated by 
cargo, route and ship size and may include in addition shipping rates for oilseeds, fertilizer and scrap metal. In the 
1980s, there are about 15 different rates for each month; by 2000 that number rises to about 25; more recently that 
number has dropped to about 15. The index was constructed by extracting the common component in the nominal 
spot rates. The resulting nominal index is expressed in dollars per metric ton, deflated using the U.S. CPI and 
detrended to account for the secular decline in shipping rates. For this paper, this series has been extended based on 
the Baltic Exchange Dry Index, which is available from Bloomberg. The latter index, which is commonly discussed 
in the financial press, is essentially identical to the nominal index in Kilian (2009a), but only available since 1985. 19 
 
futures contract of maturity h as the h-period forecast of the price of oil.
17 In particular, many 
central banks and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) use the price of NYMEX oil futures as 
a proxy for the market’s expectation of the spot price of crude oil. A widespread view is that 
prices of NYMEX futures contracts are not only good proxies for the expected spot price of oil, 
but also better predictors of oil prices than econometric forecasts. Forecasts of the spot price of 
oil are used as inputs in the macroeconomic forecasting exercises that these institutions produce. 
For example, the European Central Bank (ECB) employs oil futures prices in constructing the 
inflation and output-gap forecasts that guide monetary policy (see Svensson 2005). Likewise the 
IMF relies on futures prices as a predictor of future spot prices (see, e.g., International Monetary 
Fund 2005, p. 67; 2007, p. 42). Futures-based forecasts of the price of oil also play a role in 
policy discussions at the Federal Reserve Board. This is not to say that forecasters do not 
recognize the potential limitations of futures-based forecasts of the price of oil. Nevertheless, the 
perception among many macroeconomists, financial analysts and policymakers is that oil futures 
prices, imperfect as they may be, are the best available forecasts of the spot price of oil. Such 
attitudes have persisted notwithstanding recent empirical evidence to the contrary and 
notwithstanding the development of theoretical models aimed at explaining the lack of predictive 
ability of oil futures prices and spreads (see, e.g., Knetsch 2007; Alquist and Kilian 2010). 
  Interestingly, the conventional wisdom in macroeconomics and finance is at odds with 
long-held views about storable commodities in agricultural economics. For example, Peck 
(1985) emphasized that “expectations are reflected nearly equally in current and in futures prices. 
In this sense cash prices will be nearly as good predictions of subsequent cash prices as futures 
prices”, echoing in turn the discussion in Working (1942) who was critical of the “general 
opinion among economists that prices of commodity futures are … the market expression of 
consciously formed opinions on probable prices in the future” whereas “spot prices are not 
generally supposed to reflect anticipation of the future in the same degree as futures prices”. 
Working specifically criticized the error of “supposing that the prices of futures … tend to be 
                                                            
17 Futures contracts are financial instruments that allow traders to lock in today a price at which to buy or sell a fixed 
quantity of the commodity at a predetermined date in the future. Futures contracts can be retraded between inception 
and maturity on a futures exchange such as the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX). The NYMEX offers 
institutional features that allow traders to transact anonymously. These features reduce individual default risk and 
ensure homogeneity of the traded commodity, making the futures market a low-cost and liquid mechanism for 
hedging against and for speculating on oil price risks. The NYMEX light sweet crude contract is the most liquid and 
largest volume market for crude oil trading. 20 
 
more strongly influenced by these anticipations than are spot prices”. The next section 
investigates the empirical merits of these competing views in the context of oil markets. 
 
5.1. Forecasting Methods Based on Monthly Oil Futures Prices 
Alquist and Kilian (2010) recently provided a comprehensive evaluation of the forecast accuracy 
of models based on monthly oil futures prices using data ending in 2007.2. Below we update 
their analysis until 2009.12 and expand the range of alternative forecasting models under 
consideration.
18 In this subsection, attention is limited to forecast horizons of up to one year. Let 
) (h
t F  denote the current nominal price of the futures contract that matures in h periods,  t S  the 
current nominal spot price of oil, and  ] [ h t t S E   the expected future spot price at date t+h 
conditional on information available at t.   
A natural benchmark for forecasts based on the price of oil futures is provided by the 
random walk model without drift. This model implies that changes in the spot price are 
unpredictable, so the best forecast of the spot price of crude oil is simply the current spot price: 
   t t h t S S   | ˆ    1, 3, 6, 9, 12 h                    (1) 
This forecast is also known as the no-change forecast. In contrast, the common view that oil 




th t t SF      1, 3, 6, 9, 12 h  .                 (2) 
A closely related approach to forecasting the spot price of oil is to use the spread between the 
futures price and the spot price as an indicator of whether the price of oil is likely to go up or 
down. If the futures price equals the expected spot price, the spread should be an indicator of the 
expected change in spot prices. The rationale for this approach is clear from dividing 
() []
h
tt t h FE S    by  , t S  which results in 
() [] .
h
tt h t t t ES S F S    We explore the forecasting 
accuracy of the spread based on several alternative forecasting models. The simplest model is: 
 
   
()
| ˆ 1/ ln( )
h
t tt th t S SF S    ,     1, 3, 6, 9, 12 h             (3) 
To allow for the possibility that the spread may be a biased predictor, it is common to relax the  
                                                            
18 Because the Datastream data for the daily WTI spot price of oil used in Alquist and Kilian (2010) were 
discontinued, we rely instead on data from the Energy Information Administration. As a result the estimation 
window for the forecast comparison is somewhat shorter in some cases than in Alquist and Kilian (2010).  21 
 
assumption of a zero intercept: 
   
()
| ˆ 1/ ˆ ln( )
h
t tt th t S SF S     ,   1,3,6,9,12 h             (4) 
Alternatively, one can relax the proportionality restriction: 
    
()
| ˆ 1/ ˆln( )
h
t tt th t S SF S     ,   1,3,6,9,12 h             (5) 
Finally, we can relax both the unbiasedness and proportionality restrictions: 
    
()
| ˆ 1/ ˆ ˆ ln( )
h
t tt th t S SF S     ,   1,3,6,9,12 h  .           (6) 
Here  ˆ   and  ˆ   denote least-squares estimates obtained in real time from recursive regressions.  
  The objective is to compare the real-time forecast accuracy of models (1)-(6). Our 
empirical analysis is based on daily prices of crude oil futures traded on the NYMEX from the 
commercial provider Price-Data.com. The time series begins in March 30, 1983, when crude oil 
futures were first traded on the NYMEX, and extends through December 31, 2009. Contracts are 
for delivery at Cushing, OK. Trading ends four days prior to the 25
th calendar day preceding the 
delivery month. If the 25
th is not a business day, trading ends on the fourth business day prior to 
the last business day before the 25
th calendar day. A common problem in constructing monthly 
futures prices of a given maturity is that an h-month contract may not trade on a given day. We 
identify the h-month futures contract trading closest to the last trading day of the month and use 
the price associated with that contract as the end-of-month value. Our approach is motivated by 
the objective of computing in a consistent manner end-of-month time series of oil futures prices 
for different maturities. This allows us to match up end-of-month spot prices and futures prices 
as closely as possible. The daily spot price data are obtained from the webpage of the Energy 
Information Administration and refer to the price of West Texas Intermediate crude oil available 
for delivery at Cushing, OK. 
  Tables 4 through 8 assess the predictive accuracy of various forecasting models against 
the benchmark of a random walk without drift for horizons of 1, 3, 6, 9, and 12 months. The 
forecast evaluation period is 1991.1-2009.12 with suitable adjustments, as the forecast horizon is 
varied. The assessment of which forecasting model is most accurate may depend on the loss 
function of the forecaster (see Elliott and Timmermann 2008). We report results for the MSPE 
and the relative frequency with which a forecasting model correctly predicts the sign of the 22 
 
change in the spot price based on the success ratio statistic of Pesaran and Timmermann (2009). 
We formally test the null hypothesis that a given candidate forecasting model is as accurate as 
the random walk without drift against the alternative that the candidate model is more accurate 
than the no-change forecast. Suitably constructed p-values are shown in parentheses (as 
described in the notes to Table 4). It should be noted that commonly used tests of equal 
predictive accuracy for nested models (including the tests we rely on in this chapter) by 
construction are tests of the null of no predictability in population rather than tests of equal out-
of-sample MSPEs (see, e.g., Inoue and Kilian 2004a,b; Clark and McCracken 2010). This means 
that these tests will reject the null of equal predictive accuracy more often than they should under 
the null, suggesting caution in interpreting test results that are only marginally statistically 
significant. We will discuss this point in more detail further below. This concern does not affect 
nonnested forecast accuracy comparisons. 
Row (2) of Tables 4 through 8 shows that the oil futures price has lower MSPE than the 
no-change forecast at all horizons considered, but the differences are mostly marginal and none 
of the differences is statistically significant. For all practical purposes, the forecasts are equally 
accurate. Nor do futures forecasts have important advantages when it comes to predicting the 
sign of the change in the nominal price of oil. Only at the 12-month horizon is the success ratio 
significant at the 10 percent level. The improvement in this case is 5.7%. At the 1-month and 3-
month horizon, the success ratio of the futures price forecast actually is inferior to tossing a coin. 
Similarly, rows (3)-(6) in Tables 4 through 8 show no systematic difference between the MSPE 
of the spread-based forecasts and that of the random walk forecast. In no case is there a 
statistically significant reduction in the MSPE from using the spread model. In the rare cases in 
which one of the spread models significantly helps predict the direction of change, the gains in 
accuracy are quite moderate.  No spread model is uniformly superior to the others. 
We conclude that there is no compelling evidence that, over this sample period, monthly 
oil futures prices were more accurate predictors of the nominal price of oil than simple no-
change forecasts. Put differently, a forecaster using the most recent spot price would have done 
just as well in forecasting the nominal price of oil. This finding is broadly consistent with the 
empirical results in Alquist and Kilian (2010).  To the extent that some earlier studies have 
reported evidence more favorable to oil futures prices, the difference in results can be traced to  23 
 
the use of shorter samples.
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5.2. Other Forecasting Methods 
The preceding subsection demonstrated that simple no-change forecasts of the price of oil tend to 
be as accurate in the MSPE sense as forecasts based on oil futures prices, but this does not rule 
out that there are alternative predictors with even lower MSPE. Next we broaden the range of 
forecasting methods to include some additional predictors that are of practical interest. One 
approach is the use of parsimonious regression-based forecasting models of the spot price of 
crude oil. Another approach is the use of survey data. While economists have used survey data 
extensively in measuring the risk premium embedded in foreign exchange futures, this approach 
has not been applied to oil futures, with the exception of recent work by Wu and McCallum 
(2005). Yet another approach is to exploit the implication of the Hotelling (1931) model that the 
price of oil should grow at the rate of interest. Finally, we also consider forecasting models that 
adjust the no-change forecast for inflation expectations and for recent percent changes in other 
nominal prices. 
 
5.2.1. Parsimonious Econometric Forecasts 
One example of parsimonious econometric forecasting models is the random walk model without 
drift introduced earlier. An alternative is the double-differenced forecasting model proposed in 
Hendry (2006). Hendry observed that when time series are subject to infrequent trend changes, 
the no-change forecast may be improved upon by extrapolating today’s oil price at the most 
recent growth rate: 
    | ˆ 1
h
t t th t Ss S       1, 3, 6, 9, 12 h                 (7) 
where  t s   denotes the percent growth rate between  1 t   and  . t  In other words, we apply the no-
change forecast to the growth rate rather than the level. Although there are no obvious 
indications of structural change in our sample period, it is worth exploring this alternative 
method, given the presence of occasional large fluctuations in the price of oil.  Row (7) in Tables 
4 through 8 shows that the double-differenced specification does not work well in this case. 
                                                            
19 Although we have focused on the WTI price of oil, qualitatively similar results would also be obtained on the 
basis of Brent spot and Brent futures prices, which are available from the same data sources. The evaluation period 
for the Brent price series, however, is much shorter, casting doubt on the reliability of the results, which is why we 
focus on the WTI data. 24 
 
Especially at longer horizons, this forecasting method becomes erratic and suffers from very 
large MSPEs. Nor is this method particularly adept at predicting the sign of the change in the 
nominal price of oil. 
  Yet another strategy is to extrapolate from longer-term trends. Given that oil prices have 
been persistently trending upward (or downward) at times, it is natural to consider a random 
walk model with drift.  One possibility is to estimate this drift recursively, resulting in the 
forecasting model:  
    | ˆ ˆ 1 t th t S S        1, 3, 6, 9, 12 h                 (8) 
Alternatively, a local drift term may be estimated using rolling regressions: 
  
()
| ˆ (1 )
h
th t t t SSs      1, 3, 6, 9, 12 h  ,                        (9) 
where  t h t S | ˆ
  is the forecast of the spot price at t+h; and 
() h
t s  is the percent change in the spot 
price over the most recent h months. This local drift model postulates that traders extrapolate 
from the spot price’s recent behavior when they form expectations about the future spot price. 
The local drift model is designed to capture “short-term forecastability” that arises from local 
trends in the oil price data.  
Rows (8)-(9) in Tables 4 through 8 document that allowing for a drift typically increases 
the MSPE and in no case significantly lowers the MSPE relative to the no-change forecast, 
whether the drift is estimated based on rolling regressions or is estimated recursively. Nor does 
allowing for a drift significantly improve the ability to predict the sign of the change in the 
nominal price of oil.  
 
5.2.2. Forecasts Based on the Hotelling Model 
Another forecasting method is motivated by Hotelling’s (1931) model, which predicts that the 





|, ˆ (1 )
h
th t t t h SS i      3, 6,12 h                 (10) 
where  , th i  refers to the annualized interest rate at the relevant maturity h.
20 Although the 
                                                            
20 Assuming perfect competition, no arbitrage, and no uncertainty, oil companies extract oil at a rate that equates: (1) 
the value today of selling the oil less the costs of extraction; (2) and the present value of owning the oil, which, 25 
 
Hotelling model may seem too stylized to generate realistic predictions, we include it in this 
forecast accuracy comparison. We employ the Treasury bill rate as a proxy for the risk free 
rate.
21 Row (10) in Tables 5, 6, and 8 shows no evidence that adjusting the no-change forecast 
for the interest rate significantly lowers the MSPE.  The Hotelling model is better at predicting 
the sign of the change in the nominal price of oil than the no-change forecast, although we 
cannot assess the statistical significance of the improvement, given that there is no variability at  
all in the sign forecast. 
 
5.2.3. Survey Forecasts 
Given the significance of crude oil to the international economy, it is surprising that there are 
few organizations that produce monthly forecasts of spot prices. In the oil industry, where the 
spot price of oil is critical to investment decisions, producers tend to make annual forecasts of 
spot prices for horizons as long as 15-20 years, but these are not publicly available. The U.S. 
Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration (EIA) has published quarterly 
forecasts of the nominal price of oil since 1983. The Economist Intelligence Unit has produced 
annual forecasts since the 1990s for horizons of up to 5 years. None of these sources provides 
monthly forecasts. 
A source of monthly forecasts of the price of crude oil is Consensus Economics Inc., a 
U.K.-based company that compiles private sector forecasts in a variety of countries. Initially, the 
sample consisted of more than 100 private firms; it now contains about 70 firms. Of interest to us 
are the survey expectations for the 3- and 12-month ahead spot price of West Texas Intermediate 
crude oil, which corresponds to the type and grade delivered under the NYMEX futures contract. 
The survey provides the arithmetic average, the minimum, the maximum, and the standard 
deviation for each survey month beginning in October 1989 and ending in December 2009. We 
use the arithmetic mean at the relevant horizon: 
     |, ˆ CF
th t t h SS        3,12 h                   (11) 
Row (11) in Tables 5 and 8 reveals that this survey forecast does not significantly reduce the 
MSPE relative to the no-change forecast and may increase the MSPE substantially. The survey 
forecast is particularly poor at the 3-month horizon. At the 12-month horizon the survey forecast 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
given the model’s assumptions, is discounted at the risk free rate. In competitive equilibrium, oil companies extract 
crude oil at the socially optimal rate. 
21 Specifically, we use the 3-month, 6-month, and 12-month constant-maturity Treasury bill rates from the Federal 
Reserve Board’s website http://federalreserve.gov/releases/H15/data.htm 26 
 
has a lower MSPE than the no-change forecast, but the gain in accuracy is not statistically 
significant. There also is a statistically significant but negligible gain in directional accuracy. 
  Further analysis shows that until 2008.12 the consensus survey forecast had a much 
higher MSPE than the no-change forecast at both the 3-month and 12-month horizons. This 
pattern changes only toward the end of the sample. There is evidence that the accuracy of the 
consensus survey forecasts improves at the 12-month horizon, especially in 2009 as the oil 
market recovers from its collapse in the second half of 2008. It appears that professional 
forecasters correctly predicted a long-term price recovery in this instance, although they were not 
successful at predicting the timing of the 2009 recovery. Notwithstanding these caveats, there is 
no compelling evidence overall that survey forecasts outperform the no-change forecast.  
  We conclude that the no-change forecasts of the nominal price of oil not only are as 
accurate as forecasts based on monthly futures prices, but tend to be at least as accurate as 
forecasts based on simple econometric models or monthly survey forecasts. This result is 
consistent with common views among oil experts. For example, Peter Davies, chief economist of 
British Petroleum, has noted that “we cannot forecast oil prices with any degree of accuracy over 
any period whether short or long” (see Davies 2007).  
 
5.2.4. Predictors Based on Other Nominal Prices  
The evidence on Granger causality in section 4.1.2 suggests that some asset prices may have 
predictive power in real time for the nominal price of oil. The last rows of Tables 4 through 8 
explore that question. One approach building on Chen, Rossi and Rogoff (2010) is to use recent 
percent changes in the bilateral nominal dollar exchange rate of selected commodity exporters:  
    | ˆ (1 )
ih
th t t t SSe       1,3, 6, 9,12, h       (12) 
where    ,, . i Canada Australia South Africa   We do not include New Zealand given its poor 
showing in section 4.1.2. Tables 4 through 8 show that this approach does not significantly 
reduce the out-of-sample MSPE regardless of the exchange rate choice. There is some evidence 
that the Australian exchange rate has significant predictive power for the sign of the change in 
the nominal price of oil, but not at all horizons. For the other exchange rates, the evidence is 
even weaker. We also considered the alternative specification 
    |, ˆ (1 )
i
th t t t h SSe       1,3, 6, 9,12, h       (13) 27 
 
based on the percent change in the exchange rate over the most recent h months. That 
specification produces similar results for directional accuracy. For the MSPE, there are 
significant MSPE gains of about 13% up to horizon 3 for the Australian dollar and of about 7% 
up to horizon 6 for the Canadian dollar. The Rand performs less well. The directional accuracy 
results for all three alternative models are somewhat erratic with no model performing well 
consistently. These results are not shown in the tables to conserve space.  
  Another approach is to explore the forecasting value of recent percent changes in non-oil 
CRB commodity prices. One such forecasting model is 
    | ˆ (1 )
com h
th t t t SSp       1,3, 6, 9,12, h    , com ind met   (14) 
It can be shown that model (14) does not produce statistically significant reductions in the 
MSPE, presumably because month-to-month changes in commodity prices tend to be noisy. In 
fact, model (14) tends to worsen the MSPE ratio at long horizons, although it significantly 
improves directional accuracy at horizons up to 9 months for metals prices and up to 12 months  
for prices of industrial raw materials. An alternative model specification is based on the percent 
change in the CRB price index over the most recent h months: 
    |, ˆ (1 )
com
th t t t h SSp      1,3, 6, 9,12, h      , com ind met  , (15) 
Model (15) is designed to capture persistent changes in commodity prices in the recent past. This 
specification is less successful at predicting the direction of change at horizons beyond 6 months, 
but can yield significant reductions in the MSPE at short horizons. For example, the model using 
metals prices significantly lowers the MSPE at horizon 3 and the model using prices of industrial 
raw materials significantly reduces the MSPE at horizons 1 and 3. The MSPE reductions may be 
as large as 25% at horizon 3. That result, of course, reflects the importance of global demand 
pressures across all industrial commodities during the forecast evaluation period. To the extent 
that the price of oil sometimes is driven by other shocks, one would expect the accuracy gains 
from using model (15) to be less favorable. 
Finally, in Table 8, we include results for forecasts that adjust the no-change forecast of 
the nominal price of oil for the 1-year inflation expectations in the Michigan Survey of  
Consumers. 
    |, ˆ (1 )
MSC
th t t t h SS       12 h                (16) 
There are no similar survey expectations for shorter horizons. This more direct approach does 28 
 
not reduce the MSPE relative to the no-change forecast. The same result holds when using 
suitably scaled 10-year inflation forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. 
|, ˆ (1 )
SPF
th t t t h SS       12 h                (17) 
The fact that these results are weaker than those obtained using inflation measures in Granger 
causality tests likely means that there was not much variation in inflation expectations in our 
sample period, but considerable variation historically. 
  We conclude that despite some success of the asset price approach in predicting the sign 
of the change in the nominal price of oil, only persistent changes in CRB industrial commodity 
prices significantly reduce the MSPE of the no-change forecast and even those accuracy gains 
are limited to very short horizons. Beyond the 3-month horizon, based on the MSPE criterion, 
the no-change forecast for all practical purposes remains the most accurate model for forecasting 
the nominal price of oil in real time. 
 
5.3. Short-Horizon Forecasts Based on Daily Oil Futures Prices 
Following the extant literature, our analysis so far has relied on monthly data for oil futures 
prices and spreads constructed from daily observations. The construction of monthly data allows 
one to compare the accuracy of these forecasts to that of alternative forecasts based on data only 
available at monthly frequency. A complementary approach is to utilize all daily oil future prices 
and compare their forecasting accuracy to the no-change forecast only. This alternative approach 
makes use of all oil-futures price data and hence may have more accurate size and higher power. 
It is not without drawbacks, however. Ideally, one would like to compare the price of a futures 
contract for delivery in h months with the price of delivery exactly h months later, where one 
month corresponds to 21 business days. That price, however, is not observed. The spot price 
quoted on the day of delivery instead will be the price for delivery sometime in the month 
following the date on which the futures contract matures. In fact, the date of delivery associated 
with a given spot price can never be made exact. We therefore follow the convention of 
evaluating futures price forecasts against the spot price prevailing when the futures contract 
matures. A reasonable case can be made that this is what practitioners view as the relevant 
forecasting exercise.  
Note that the daily data are sparse in that there are many days for which no price quotes 
exist. We eliminate these dates from the sample and stack the remaining observations similar to 29 
 
the approach taken in Kilian and Vega (2010) in the context of modeling the impact of U.S. 
macroeconomic news on the nominal price of oil. Table 9 summarizes our findings. The MSPE 
ratios in Table 9 indicate somewhat larger gains in forecasting accuracy from using oil futures 
prices than in Tables 4 through 8. There are a number of caveats, however. First, the h-month oil 
futures forecasts are not forecasts for a horizon of h months, as in Tables 4 through 8, but rather 
for a horizon that may vary arbitrarily between h and h+1 months. For example, an oil futures 
contract quoted on August 13 for delivery starting on October 1 would be considered a 1-month 
contract for the purpose of Table 9, but so would an oil-futures contract quoted on August 25 for 
delivery starting on October 1. This is an inherent limitation of working with daily oil futures 
price data. This concern suggests caution in interpreting short-horizon results, but obviously 
becomes less important as h increases. A second concern is that the sample period spanned by 
the daily data extends back to January 1986, whereas the data in Tables 4 through 8 start in 1990. 
This difference is not driving the results in Table 9. It can be shown that making the sample 
period compatible with that in the earlier Tables would yield substantively identical results.  
The third and most important concern is the statistical significance of the results in Table 
9. Given that the sample size in Table 9 is larger than in Tables 4 through 8 by a factor of about 
10, care must be exercised in interpreting the p-values. As is well known, for sufficiently large 
sample sizes, any null hypothesis is bound to be rejected at conventional significance levels, 
making it inappropriate to apply the same significance level as in Tables 4 through 8. In 
recognition of this problem, Leamer (1978, p. 108-120) proposes a rule for constructing sample-
size dependent critical values. For example, for the F-statistic, the appropriate level of statistical 
significance is  
(1/ ) 1( 1 ) ( 1 ) , 1 , .
t fcdf t t t      For  216, t   as in Table 4, this rule of thumb 
implies a threshold for rejecting the null hypothesis of 0.0209.    In contrast, for  5968 t   the 
same rule implies a much higher threshold of  0.0032.    Applying this rule to the p-values in 
Table 9, none of the MSPE reductions are statistically significant except at the 12-month 
horizon. The MSPE ratio at the 12-month horizon of 0.93 is similar to the ratio of 0.94 reported 
in Table 8 based on monthly data. The statistical significance of these MSPE gains in Table 9 is 
likely to be due to the larger sample size, illustrating the power gains from using daily data. 
There also is evidence that at horizons 6, 9 and 12, the oil futures price has statistically 
significant directional accuracy, but the gains are quantitatively negligible except perhaps at 
horizon 12.  30 
 
These results lead us to revise somewhat our earlier findings. We conclude that there is 
statistically significant evidence that oil futures prices improve on the accuracy of the no-change 
forecast of the nominal price of oil at the 1-year horizon, but not at shorter horizons. The 
magnitude of these gains in accuracy is modest – at least by the standards of the literature on 
forecasting macroeconomic aggregates such as inflation rates. Moreover, there are indications 
that this result is sensitive to changes in the sample period and may not be robust as more data 
accumulate. After eliminating the data beyond March 2008, for example, the MSPE ratio of the 
12-month futures price exceeds 1 and only when extending the sample period beyond July 2008 
is the MSPE reduction statistically significant. This result, together with the lack of evidence for 
slightly shorter or slightly longer futures contracts, suggests caution in interpreting the evidence 
for the 12-month contract in Table 9.  
 
6. Long-Horizon Forecasts of the Nominal Price of Oil 
For oil industry managers facing investment decisions or for policymakers pondering the 
medium-term economic outlook a horizon of one year is too short. Crude oil futures may have 
maturities as long as seven years. Notwithstanding the low liquidity of oil futures markets at such 
long horizons, documented in Alquist and Kilian (2010), it is precisely these long horizons that 
many policymakers focus on. For example, Greenspan (2004a) explicitly referred to the 6-year 
oil futures contract in assessing effective long-term supply prices. For similar statements also see 
Greenspan (2004b), Gramlich (2004) and Bernanke (2004). In this section we focus on 
forecasting the nominal price of oil at horizons up to seven years. 
It can be shown that the daily data are too sparse at horizons beyond one year to allow the 
construction of time series of end-of-month observations for oil futures prices. However, we can 
instead evaluate each daily futures price quote for contracts of any given maturity against the 
spot price that is realized on the day the contract expires. We already used this approach in Table 
9 for horizons up to one year. One drawback of extending this approach to longer horizons is that 
the evaluation period for long-horizon contracts may exclude many of the particularly 
informative observations at the end of our sample period. Another drawback is that long-horizon 
futures prices are sparsely quoted, greatly reducing the sample size as the horizon is lengthened. 
For that reason, one would expect the results to be far less reliable than the earlier short-horizon 
results. Nevertheless, they provide the only indication we have of the usefulness of oil futures  31 
 
prices at the horizons at which they are employed by many policymakers. 
Table 10 shows the results for horizons of 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 years. In sharp contrast with  
Table 9 the MSPE ratios are consistently above 1, indicating that oil futures prices are less 
accurate than the no-change forecast. In no case is there evidence of significant reductions in the 
MSPE. The test for directional accuracy is statistically significant at the two-year horizon, but 
not at longer horizons. In fact, in many cases the success ratios at longer horizons are distinctly 
worse than tossing a coin. Table 10 provides no evidence in support of the common practice at 
central banks of appealing to the price of long-horizon oil futures contracts as an indication of 
future spot prices. In particular, at a horizon of six years, which figures prominently in policy 
statements and speeches, central bankers would have been much better off relying on the no-
change forecast than on oil futures prices. 
An interesting question is whether the poor accuracy of forecasts from oil futures prices 
beyond one year simply reflects a sharp drop-off in the liquidity of oil futures markets at longer 
horizons. This does not appear to be the case. Figure 5 plots two measures of the liquidity of the 
oil futures market by horizon. Open interest is the total number of futures contracts, either long 
or short, that have been entered into for a given delivery month and have not yet been offset by 
another transaction or by physical delivery of oil. It measures the total number of contracts 
outstanding for delivery in a specific month. Volume is the total number of contracts traded 
during a specific period of time. Contracts are denoted in units of 1,000 barrels of crude oil. 
Although both average open interest and average trading volume drop off quickly with 
increasing maturity, it is not the case that average liquidity at the daily frequency is 
discontinuously lower at horizons beyond one year than at the 12-month horizon. Rather the 
decline in average liquidity is smooth.  
One concern with the results in Table 10 is that the most traded oil futures contracts are 
the June and December contracts. This suggests focusing on the most liquid daily contracts 
rather than averaging results across all daily contracts, as we did in Table 10.  Below we report 
sensitivity analysis for this subset of daily oil futures contracts. Because long-term futures 
contracts only became available in recent years and because their use greatly reduces the 
effective sample size, we focus on June and December contracts with maturities of one, two and 
three years. Based on the evaluation period of 1998-2010, we find that one-year contracts have 
an MSPE ratio of 0.91 compared with the no-change forecast, two-year contracts an MSPE ratio 32 
 
of 1.01 and three-year contracts an MSPE ratio of 1.27. These results are qualitatively similar to 
those in Table 10 for the same maturities, suggesting that there are no gains in forecast accuracy  
from restricting the sample. 
Finally, we note that these results may not have been apparent in the years when longer-
term oil futures contracts were first introduced. As recently as in the late 1990s, a forecaster 
employing the same methods that we used in this section, would have found that the monthly 
price of oil futures contracts with one-year maturity is much more accurate than the no-change 
forecast, although the MSPE reductions declined steadily throughout the 1990s, as more 
information became available, and the ratio has oscillated about 1 since then. Even two- and 
three-year daily contracts, which were introduced much more recently, initially seemed to 
forecast more accurately than the no-change forecast, but these MSPE reductions have been 
reversed more recently. Given that the forecast errors become more highly serially correlated, the 
higher the data frequency, very long samples are required for reliable estimates of relative 
MSPEs.  Clearly, an evaluation period of fifteen years, for example, is insufficient to learn about 
the forecasting ability of oil futures prices, as illustrated by the repeated sharp reversals in 
forecast rankings over time. Even our results must be considered tentative and could be reversed 
as more data become available. 
One possible explanation for the unexpectedly low out-of-sample accuracy of oil futures-
based forecasts may be the presence of transaction costs impeding arbitrage. An alternative 
forecasting strategy in which one uses the futures price only if the futures spread exceeds 5% in 
absolute terms and uses the spot price otherwise, yields MSPE reductions between 0% and 6% at 
short horizons. Notably the MSPE reductions at horizons of 3 and 6 months are statistically 
significant in both the daily and the monthly data.  At horizons beyond one year, this alternative 
method is much less accurate than the no-change forecast, however. 
 
7. Do Survey Expectations Track Econometric Forecasts of Nominal Energy Prices? 
Models of purchases of energy-intensive durables depend not on the price of crude oil, but on the 
retail price of energy. A case in point is the demand for automobiles. Although there can be 
substantial discrepancies between the evolution of the price of crude oil and the price of gasoline 
in the short run, long-horizon forecasts of the price of gasoline will track long-horizon forecasts 
of the price of crude oil (see Kilian 2010). In modeling automobile purchases researchers often 33 
 
need to take a stand on consumers’ expectations of gasoline prices. A variety of modeling 
strategies has been explored, often with widely different results. Candidates include ARIMA 
models, no-change forecasts, oil futures prices and gasoline futures prices (see, e.g., Kahn 1986; 
Davis and Kilian 2010; Allcott and Wozny 2010). The issue is not only one of finding a 
forecasting method that achieves the smallest possible out-of-sample forecast error, but of 
understanding how consumers form their price expectations. An obvious concern is that actual 
consumer expectations may differ from the predictions generated by the forecasting methods 
considered so far. Unfortunately, time series data on consumer expectations of gasoline prices 
are rare, which has prevented a systematic investigation of this important question. 
  Recently, Anderson, Kellogg and Sallee (2010) obtained a previously unused data set 
from the Michigan Survey of Consumers on U.S. households’ expectations of gasoline prices. 
The survey asks consumers about how many cents per gallon they think gasoline prices will 
increase or decrease during the next five years compared to now. Median responses are available 
for 1984.10-2010.1, but there are gaps in the data, preventing the construction of a continuous 
monthly time series. Expectations data may be constructed by adding the expected change in the 
price of gasoline to the current monthly U.S. city average retail price of gasoline (quoted in cents 
per gallon including taxes), as reported by the Energy Information Administration (EIA). The 
upper panel of Figure 6 shows that the median 5-year survey forecast systematically exceeds the 
current gasoline price. The magnitude of the gap varies over time.  
As Anderson et al. observe, a likely explanation of this pattern is that households form 
their expectations by adding long-term inflation expectations to the current price of gasoline. If 
we adjust the survey gasoline price forecast for the 10-year inflation forecast in the Survey of 
Professional Forecasters (suitably scaled to the 5-year horizon), the two series line up rather well 
on average, implying that households’ expectations of gasoline prices closely resemble a random 
walk forecast for the real price of gasoline (see second panel of Figure 6).
22 Only on rare 
occasions such as immediately before the peak of the nominal price of oil in mid-2008 and near 
the oil price trough of 2008/2009 do household expectations depart from the no-change forecast. 
                                                            
22 The corresponding 5-year Michigan survey inflation expectations are only available back to mid-2004, making the 
Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) data the best available proxy for 5-year inflation expectations (after 
suitable scaling). These data were obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Although the SPF data 
are quarterly, the data evolve so smoothly that assigning the same quarterly value to each month in that quarter is 
likely to provide a good approximation. 34 
 
In the first instance, households predicted an even higher price of oil; in the second instance, they 
did not expect the price of oil to drop as sharply as it did. 
The evidence in Figure 6 supports the view that the no-change forecast for the real price 
of gasoline is a better proxy than alternative forecasting models for modeling durables purchases. 
That evidence also is of interest more generally, given the finding in Edelstein and Kilian (2009) 
that fluctuations in retail energy prices are dominated by fluctuations in gasoline prices. Finally, 
the absence of money illusion in households’ gasoline price forecasts is of independent interest.  
  An out-of-sample forecast accuracy comparison between the survey forecast and the no- 
change forecast of the nominal price of gasoline shows that survey data are quite accurate with 
an MSPE ratio of only 0.765 (see Table 11). The p-value for the null hypothesis of equal 
predictive accuracy is 0.000.  The success ratio of 0.907 is also extraordinarily high.
23 The 
reason for these rather strong improvements on the no-change forecast is that at such long 
horizons the inflation component of the nominal price of gasoline becomes very large and cannot 
be ignored. In other words, it is a fairly safe bet that the price of gasoline must increase in 
nominal terms over a five-year horizon.
24  
The same logic applies to the nominal price of oil. As we showed in section 4, predicting 
the price of oil at the one-year horizon based on expected inflation (much like households 
apparently predict the price of gasoline), would not have been more successful than the no-
change forecast. Repeating that exercise at the 5-year horizon, however, using the same SPF 
inflation expectations data as in Figure 6, produces a highly significant MSPE ratio of 0.855 and 
a very high success ratio of 0.811 for the nominal price of oil as well (see Table 11). This simple 
forecasting rule is also much more accurate than the forecast implied by the 5-year oil futures 
price. 
The last panel of Figure 6 shows that, notwithstanding this improved long-horizon 
forecast accuracy, households committed systematic forecast errors during the most recent oil 
price surge. Between 1998 and 2004, households persistently underestimated the price of 
gasoline. This evidence may help explain the continued popularity of SUVs, light trucks and 
other energy-inefficient automobiles during this period. Presumably, consumers would not have 
                                                            
23 The Pesaran-Timmermann test for directional accuracy cannot be applied because there is no variability in the 
predicted sign, making it impossible to judge the statistical significance of the success ratio. 
24 A question of obvious interest is how the survey predictor compares with the price of gasoline futures. That 
comparison is not feasible due to data limitations. The longest maturity in the NYMEX gasoline futures market is 3 
years, and the 3-year futures contract only became available in 2007. 35 
 
chosen to buy as many SUVs, had they foreseen the subsequent increase in gasoline prices at the 
time of their purchase decision. 
  There are no household surveys of oil price expectations, but, as discussed earlier, there 
are monthly data on the views of professional forecasters in the Consensus Economics forecast.  
Figure 7 highlights some systematic differences between these professional forecasts and the 
corresponding household gasoline price expectations. Whereas households’ gasoline price 
forecast tends to exceed the current gasoline price by the expected inflation rate, professional oil 
price forecasts most of the time are below the current price of oil. The upper panel of Figure 7 
shows that professional forecasters tend to smooth the predicted path relative to the current price. 
This smoothing is especially apparent during large oil price fluctuations such as those in 
1990/91, in 1999/2000, and in 2003-2009. This tendency contributes to the large and persistently 
negative forecast errors shown in the lower panel of Figure 7 and helps explain why the 
consensus forecast does not significantly improve on the no-change forecast (see Table 11). 
  One possible explanation of the less than satisfactory accuracy of these survey forecasts 
in section 4 is that professional macroeconomic forecasters may not be experts on the oil market. 
Figure 8 therefore focuses on an alternative time series of 1-quarter and 4-quarters-ahead 
forecasts of the U.S. nominal refiners’ acquisition cost for imported crude oil. These data were 
collected from the EIA’s Short-term Economic Outlook, which is published by the U.S. 
Department of Energy. Given the difference in frequency and oil price definition the results are 
not strictly speaking comparable with our earlier analysis of the monthly WTI price. 
Nevertheless, these data are illuminating. Figure 8 illustrates that even these expert forecasts 
generally underpredicted the price of crude oil between 2004 and mid-2008, especially at longer 
horizons, while overpredicting it following the collapse of the price of oil in mid-2008 and 
underpredicting it again more recently. A natural question is how the EIA forecasts compare to 
the no-change forecast on the basis of the EIA’s preliminary data releases for the current 
refiners’ acquisition cost for imported crude oil. The latter data are provided by the same source. 
The DM test for equal predictive accuracy in Table 11 suggests that the MSPE ratio of 0.92 for 
the 1-quarter-ahead forecast is statistically significant at the 10% level, but the MSPE ratio of 
0.97 for the 4-quarters-ahead forecast is not. We conclude that even the EIA has had at best 
modest success in forecasting the nominal price of oil in the short run and none at longer 
horizons. 36 
 
8. Short-Horizon Forecasts of the Real Price of Oil 
Our analysis in section 4 suggests that we stand a better chance of forecasting the real price of oil 
out-of-sample using monthly data, given the availability of more appropriate predictors at the 
monthly frequency. A natural benchmark for all forecasting models of the real price of oil is 
again the no-change forecast. At short horizons, inflation is expected to be at best moderate and 
it may seem that there is every reason to expect the high forecast accuracy of the random walk 
model without drift relative to less parsimonious regression models to carry over to the real price 
of oil (see Kilian 2010).
25 On the other hand, in forecasting the real price of oil we may rely on 
additional economic structure and on additional predictors that could potentially improve 
forecast accuracy. Section 8 explores a number of such models. In addition to focusing on the 
real WTI price, we also present results for the real refiners’ acquisition cost for oil imports. 
 
8.1. Real U.S. Refiners’ Acquisition Cost for Imported Crude Oil 
8.1.1. Unrestricted AR, ARMA and VAR Models 
A useful starting point is a forecast accuracy comparison of selected monthly AR and ARMA 
models for the real price of oil in log levels and in log differences.  Both classes of models are 
evaluated in terms of their ability to predict the log level of the real price of oil in recursive 
settings. 
  Below we consider two alternative measures of the real price of oil: The U.S. refiners’ 
acquisition cost for imported crude oil, which may be thought of as a proxy for the price of oil in 
global oil markets, and the WTI price; in both cases the deflator is the U.S. CPI. First consider 
the refiners’ acquisition cost.  Estimation starts in 1973.2, and the evaluation period is 1991.12-
2009.8 to facilitate direct comparisons with VAR models of the global market for crude oil in 
this and the next section.
26 All MSPE results are expressed as fractions of the MSPE of the no-
change forecast. Some models are based on fixed lag orders of 12 or 24, whereas others rely on 
the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) or the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for lag order 
                                                            
25 Such a finding would not necessarily imply that the real price of oil actually follows a random walk. It could 
merely reflect the fact that the bias-variance tradeoff favors parsimonious forecasting models in small samples. The 
local-to-zero asymptotic approximation of predictive models suggests that using the no-change forecast may lower 
the asymptotic MSPE even relative to the correctly specified non-random walk model, provided the local drift 
parameter governing the predictive relationship is close enough to zero (see, e.g., Inoue and Kilian (2004b), Clark 
and McCracken 2010).  
26 The refiners’ acquisition cost was extrapolated back to 1973.2 as in Barsky and Kilian (2002). 37 
 
selection (see Inoue and Kilian 2006; Marcellino, Stock and Watson 2006). We search over 
  0,...,12 . p  The forecast accuracy results are robust to allowing for a larger upper bound. 
There are no theoretical results in the forecasting literature on how to assess the null of 
equal predictive accuracy when comparing iterated AR or ARMA forecasts to the no-change 
forecast. In particular, the standard tests discussed in Clark and McCracken (2001, 2005) or 
Clark and West (2007) are only designed for direct forecasts. Below we assess the significance 
of the MSPE reductions based on bootstrap p-values for the MSPE ratio constructed under the 
null of a random walk model without drift.
27 The upper panel of Table 12 suggests that AR and 
ARMA models in log levels have lower recursive MSPE than the no-change forecast at short 
horizons. The accuracy gains may approach 17% in some cases and are highly statistically 
significant. Beyond the six-month horizon, all gains in forecast accuracy evaporate. There also 
are statistically significant gains in directional accuracy at horizons 1 and 3, and in some cases at 
horizon 6. There is little to choose between the AR(12), ARMA(1,1), AR(SIC) and AR(AIC) 
specifications overall. The AR(24) model has slightly better directional accuracy at longer 
horizons, but at the cost of a higher MSPE ratio.   
The lower panel of Table 12 shows the corresponding forecasting models in log 
differences. Note that after imposing the unit root, the autoregressive lag order is reduced by one. 
For example, an ARMA(1,1) model in levels corresponds to an MA(1) model in differences.  We 
find that models in log differences generally are about as accurate as models in log levels. There 
is robust evidence of statistically significant MSPE reductions at horizons 1 and 3 and there are 
statistically significant gains in directional accuracy at horizons of up to 6 months in some cases. 
There is little to choose between the five forecasting models in log differences. 
We conclude (1) that forecasting the real price of oil based on models in log levels is by 
no means inferior to forecasting based on models in log differences; (2) that simple AR or 
ARMA models with fixed lag orders perform quite well; and (3) that the no-change forecast of 
the real price of oil can be improved upon at horizons of 1 month and 3 months, but generally not 
at horizons beyond half a year.  
All models in Table 12 have in common that the information set is restricted to past 
values of the real price of oil. The question we turn to next is whether suitably chosen 
                                                            
27 Because there is no reason to expect the limiting distribution of the DM test statistic to be pivotal in this context, 
we bootstrap the average loss differential instead. 38 
 
macroeconomic predictors can be used to improve further on the no-change forecast. Recently, a 
number of structural vector autoregressive models of the global market for crude oil have been 
proposed (see, e.g., Kilian 2009). These models produce empirically plausible estimates of the 
impact of demand and supply shocks in the oil market. A natural conjecture is that such models 
may also have value for forecasting. Here we focus on the reduced-form representation of the 
VAR model in Kilian and Murphy (2010). The sample period is 1973.2-2009.8. The variables in 
this model include the percent change in global crude oil production, the global real activity 
measure we already discussed in section 4, the log of the real price of oil, and a proxy for the 
change in global above-ground crude oil inventories. For further discussion of the data see Kilian 
and Murphy (2010). The VAR model may be consistently estimated without taking a stand on 
whether the real price of oil is I(0) or I(1) (see Sims, Stock and Watson 1990). We focus on 
recursive rather than rolling regression forecasts throughout this section. This approach makes 
sense in the absence of structural change, given the greater efficiency of recursive regressions 
and the small sample size.
28  
A natural starting point for the forecast accuracy comparison is the unrestricted VAR 
model.  An obvious concern with forecasting from unrestricted vector autoregressions is that 
these highly parameterized models are subject to considerable estimation uncertainty which 
tends to inflate the out-of-sample MSPE. For that reason unrestricted VAR models are rarely 
used in applied forecasting. They nevertheless provide a useful point of departure. The upper 
panel of Table 13 shows results for unrestricted VAR models with 12 lags. Column (1) 
corresponds to the four-variable model used in Kilian and Murphy (2010). Table 13 shows that 
this unrestricted VAR forecast has lower recursive MSPE than the no-change forecast at all 
horizons but one and nontrivial directional accuracy.
29 Despite the lack of parsimony, the 
reductions in the MSPE are somewhat larger than for the AR and ARMA models in Table 12. 
Bootstrap p-values for the MSPE ratio constructed under the null of a random walk model 
without drift indicate statistically significant reductions in the MSPE at horizons 1, 3, and 6. At 
longer horizons it becomes harder to beat the no-change forecast benchmark and there are no 
                                                            
28 Rolling regression forecasts would not protect us from structural change in any case. It has been shown that the 
presence of structural breaks at unknown points in the future invalidates the use of forecasting model rankings 
obtained in forecast accuracy comparisons whether one uses rolling or recursive regression forecasts (see Inoue and 
Kilian 2006). 
29 It also outperforms the random walk model with drift in both of these dimensions, whether the drift is estimated 
recursively or as the average growth rate over the most recent h months. These results are not shown to conserve 
space. 39 
 
statistically significant reductions in the MSPE. There also is evidence of statistically significant 
gains in directional accuracy at horizons 1 and 3. 
The forecasting success of the VAR approach clearly depends on the choice of variables 
and of the lag length. The remaining columns of the upper panel of Table 13 show analogous 
results for five other unrestricted VAR(12) models obtained by dropping one or more of the 
variables included in model (1). None of these models performs as well as the original four-
variable model with two exceptions. The bivariate model (4) which includes only the change in 
oil inventories and the real price of oil has slightly lower MSPE than the four-variable VAR(12) 
model and similar directional accuracy, as does the trivariate model (6) specification that drops 
oil production from the baseline model.  
The lower panel of Table 13 suggests that including 24 lags in the unrestricted model 
tends to reduce the MSPE reductions. All VAR(24) models but model (2) still significantly 
improve on the MSPE of the no-change forecast at horizons 1 and 3, but their MSPE ratio tends 
to exceed unity at higher horizons. Likewise, all six VAR(24) models yield statistically 
significant gains in directional accuracy at short horizons. Only the four VAR(24) models that 
include the global real activity variable in the model, however, retain their superior directional 
accuracy at all horizons. Unlike in the corresponding VAR(12) models, the gains in directional 
accuracy are statistically significant at all horizons. 
We conclude that there is important predictive information in the change in oil 
inventories and in global real activity in particular, whereas the inclusion of oil production 
growth appears less important for forecasting.  Moreover, based on the MSPE metric, suitably 
chosen VAR models systematically outperform the no-change forecast at short horizons. At 
longer horizons, the no-change forecast remains unbeaten, except based on the sign metric. This 
result immediately extends to longer horizons because none of the VAR forecasting models are 
suitable for extrapolating to long horizons. 
  It is important to keep in mind, however, that Table 13 may overstate the true statistical 
significance of the short-horizon MSPE reductions. One indication of this problem is that Table 
13 sometimes indicates statistically significant rejections of the no-change forecast benchmark 
even when the MSPE ratio exceeds 1, indicating that the VAR has a strictly higher recursive 
MSPE. The reason for this counterintuitive result is that, as discussed earlier, standard tests of 
equal predictive accuracy do not test the null of equal out-of-sample MSPEs, but actually test the 40 
 
null of no predictability in population – much like the Granger causality tests we applied earlier – 
as pointed out by Inoue and Kilian (2004a). This point is readily apparent from the underlying  
proofs of asymptotic validity as well as the way in which critical values are simulated. 
The distinction between population predictability and out-of-sample predictability does  
not matter asymptotically under fixed parameter asymptotics, but fixed parameter asymptotics 
typically provide a poor approximation to the finite-sample accuracy of forecasting models. 
Under more appropriate local asymptotics (designed to mimic the weak predictive power of 
many regressors) it can be shown that the null of no predictability in population is distinct from 
the null of equal out-of-sample MSPEs. It is always easier to reject the former than the latter. In 
other words, conventional tests of equal predictive accuracy test the wrong null hypothesis and 
may spuriously reject the no-change forecast in favor of the alternative. This is the deeper reason 
for the very low p-value obtained, for example, for model (1) with 24 lags at horizon 3. The 
intuition for this rejection is that under the null that the real price of oil is unpredictable one 
would expect much higher MSPE ratios than 1.047, so the fact that the MSPE of the VAR model 
is so close to 1 actually is evidence in favor of the VAR model being the population model.  
Which model is the population model, of course, is irrelevant for the question of which 
model generates more accurate forecasts in finite samples, so we have to interpret this rejection 
with some caution. This type of insight recently has prompted the development of alternative 
tests of equal predictive accuracy based on local-to-zero asymptotic approximations to the 
predictive regression. Clark and McCracken (2010) for the first time proposed a correctly 
specified test of the null of equal out-of-sample MSPEs. Their analysis is limited to direct 
forecasts from much simpler forecasting models, however, and cannot be applied in Table 13.
30  
This caveat suggests that we discount only marginally statistically significant rejections of the no 
predictability null hypothesis in Table 13 and focus on the highly statistically significant test 




30 The size problem of conventional tests of equal predictive accuracy gets worse, when the number of extra 
predictors under the alternative grows large relative to the sample size. This point has also been discussed in a much 
simpler context by Anatolyev (2007) who shows that modifying conventional test statistics for equal predictive 
accuracy may remove these size distortions. Related results can be found in Calhoun (2010) who shows that 
standard tests of equal predictive accuracy for nested models such as Clark and McCracken (2001) or Clark and 
West (2007) will choose the larger model too often when the smaller model is more accurate in out-of-sample 
forecasts and also proposes alternative asymptotic approximations based on many predictors. None of the remedies 
is directly applicable in the context of Table 12, however. 41 
 
8.1.2. Real-Time Forecasts 
The results so far are encouraging in that they suggest that VAR models (even more so than AR 
or ARMA models) may produce useful short-horizon forecasts of the real price of oil. An 
important caveat regarding the results in Tables 12 and 13 is that the forecast accuracy 
comparison is not conducted in real time. There are two rather distinct concerns. One is that not 
all useful predictors may be available to the forecaster in real time. The other concern is that 
many predictors and indeed some measures of the price of oil are subject to data revisions. This 
caveat applies even to the no-change forecast. The reason is that the refiners’ acquisition cost 
data become available only with a delay of about three months and the CPI data used to deflate 
the refiners’ acquisition cost become available only with a one-month delay.  
Additional caveats apply to the VAR evidence. Although the dry cargo shipping rate data 
underlying the real activity index are available in real time and not subject to revisions, the 
construction of the real activity index involves real-time CPI data as well real-time estimates of 
the trend in real shipping rates. Moreover, the data on global crude oil production only become 
available with a delay of 4 months and the data used to approximate global crude oil inventories 
with a delay of five months. This is less of a concern for the oil production data which tend to 
evolve rather smoothly than for the more volatile data on changes in crude oil inventories for 
which there is no good real time proxy. How imposing these real-time data constraints alters the 
relative accuracy of no-change benchmark model compared with VAR models is not clear a 
priori because both the benchmark model and the alternative model are affected.  
The first study to investigate this question is Baumeister and Kilian (2011) who recently 
developed a real-time data set for the variables in question. They find (based on a data set 
extending until 2010.6) that VAR forecasting models of the type considered in this section can 
generate substantial improvements in real-time forecast accuracy. The MSPE reduction for 
unrestricted VAR models may be as high as 25% at the one-month horizon and as high as 9% at 
the three-month horizon. At longer horizons the MSPE reductions diminish even for the best 
VAR models. Beyond one year, the no-change forecast usually has lower MSPE than the VAR 
model. Baumeister and Kilian also show that VAR forecasting models based on Kilian and 
Murphy (2010) exhibit significantly improved directional accuracy. The improved directional 
accuracy persists even at horizons at which the MSPE gains have vanished. The success ratios 
range from 0.51 to 0.60, depending on the model specification and horizon. 42 
 
8.2. Real WTI Price  
Tables 14 and 15 show the corresponding results based on the real WTI price of oil instead of the 
real U.S. refiners’ acquisition cost for imported crude oil. These results are not so much intended 
to validate those in Tables 12 and 13, given the inherent differences in the definition of the oil 
price data, but are of independent and complementary interest. The estimation and evaluation 
periods are unchanged to allow direct comparisons. The nominal WTI price is available without 
delay and is not subject to revisions, reducing concerns over the real-time availability of the oil  
price data. 
Table 14 provides robust evidence that AR and ARMA models improve on the no-change 
forecast of the real WTI price of oil at horizons 1 and 3 with the exception of models with 24 
lags. The largest MSPE reductions are only 5%, however, and all such accuracy gains vanish at 
longer horizons. The VAR results in Table 15 paint a similar picture. None of the VAR(12) 
models has significantly lower MSPE than the no-change forecast beyond horizon 6. In general 
the reductions in MSPEs are smaller than in Table 13. The largest MSPE reduction is 16% at 
horizon 3. Likewise, the evidence that forecasts from VAR models with 24 lags have directional 
accuracy is weaker than in Table 13. By the MSPE metric, only in rare cases are the VAR(24) 
models more accurate than the no-change forecast of the real WTI price of oil. This finding 
highlights that the definition of the real price of oil matters for the degree of forecastability. 
Clearly, the real price of WTI crude oil is more difficult to forecast in the short run than the real 
U.S. refiners’ acquisition cost for imported crude oil.  
Broadly similar results would be obtained with real-time data (see Baumeister and Kilian 
2011). Unlike for the real refiners’ acquisition cost, the differences between real-time forecasts 
of the real WTI price and forecasts based on ex-post revised data tend to be small.  
 
8.3. Restricted VAR Models 
Although the results for the unrestricted VAR models in Tables 13 and 15 are encouraging, there 
is reason to believe that alternative estimation methods may reduce the MSPE of the VAR 
forecast even further. One candidate is the use of Bayesian shrinkage estimation methods. In the 
VAR model at hand a natural starting point would be to shrink all lagged parameters toward zero 
under the maintained assumption of stationarity. This leaves open the question of how to 
determine the weights of the prior relative to the information in the likelihood. Giannone, Lenza 43 
 
and Primiceri (2010) recently proposed a simple and theoretically founded data-based method for 
the selection of priors in recursively estimated Bayesian VARs (BVARs).  Their 
recommendation is to select priors using the marginal data density (i.e., the likelihood function 
integrated over the model parameters), which only depends on the hyperparameters that 
characterize the relative weight of the prior and the information in the data. They provide 
empirical examples in which the forecasting accuracy of that model in recursive settings is not 
only superior to unrestricted VAR models, but is comparable to that of single-equation dynamic 
factor models (see Stock and Watson 1999).  
Table 16 compares the forecasting accuracy of this approach with that of the unrestricted  
VAR models considered in Tables 13 and 15. In all cases, we shrink the model parameters 
toward a white noise prior mean with the desired degree of shrinkage being determined by the 
data-based procedure in Giannone et al. (2010).  For models with 12 lags, there is no strong 
evidence that shrinkage estimation reduces the MSPE. Although there are some cases in which 
imposing Bayesian priors reduces the MSPE slightly, in other cases it increases the MSPE 
slightly. For models with 24 lags, however, shrinkage estimation often greatly reduces the MSPE 
ratio and typically produces forecasts about as accurate as forecasts from the corresponding 
model with 12 lags. As in Tables 12 and 14, there is evidence of MSPE reductions at horizons of 
up to 6 months.  For example, model (1) with 12 lags yields MSPE reductions of 20% at horizon 
1, 12% at horizon 3, and 3% at horizon 6 with no further gains at longer horizons. Model (1) 
with 24 lags yields gains of 20%, 12% and 1%, respectively. Again, it can be shown that similar 
gains in accuracy are feasible even using real-time data (see Baumeister and Kilian 2011).   
In addition, such VAR models can also be useful for studying how baseline forecasts of 
the real price of oil must be adjusted under hypothetical forecasting scenarios, as illustrated in 
the next section. This does require the VAR model to be fully identified, however. 
 
9. Structural VAR Forecasts of the Real Price of Oil 
Recent research has shown that historical fluctuations in the real price of oil can be decomposed 
into the effects of distinct oil demand and oil supply shocks associated with unpredictable shifts 
in global oil production, real activity and a forward-looking or speculative element in the real 
price of oil (see, e.g., Kilian and Murphy 2010). Changes in the composition of these shocks help 
explain why conventional regressions of macroeconomic aggregates on the price of oil tend to be  44 
 
unstable. They also are potentially important in interpreting oil price forecasts. 
In section 8 we showed that recursive forecasts of the real price of oil based on the type 
of oil market VAR model proposed in Kilian and Murphy (2010) for the purpose of structural 
analysis are not necessarily inferior to simple no-change forecasts. The case for the use of VAR 
models, however, does not rest on their predictive accuracy alone. Policymakers expect oil price 
forecasts to be interpretable in light of an economic model. They also expect forecasters to be 
able to generate projections conditional on a variety of hypothetical economic scenarios. 
Questions of interest include, for example, what effects an unexpected slowing of Asian growth 
would have on the forecast of the real price of oil; or what the effect would be of an unexpected 
decline in global oil production associated with peak oil. Answering questions of this type is 
impossible using reduced-form time series models. It requires a fully structural VAR model (see 
Waggoner and Zha 1999).  
In this section we illustrate how to generate such projections from the structural moving 
average representation of the VAR model of Kilian and Murphy (2010) estimated on data 
extending to 2009.8. The discussion closely follows Baumeister and Kilian (2011). This model 
allows the identification of three structural shocks: (1) a shock to the flow of the production of 
crude oil (“flow supply shock), (2) a shock to the flow demand for crude oil and other industrial 
commodities (“flow demand shock”) that reflects unexpected fluctuations in the global business 
cycle, and (3) a shock to the demand for oil inventories arising from forward-looking behavior 
(“speculative demand shock”). The structural demand and supply shocks in this model are 
mainly identified by a combination of sign restrictions and bounds on impact price elasticities. 
This model is set-identified, but the admissible models can be shown to be quite similar, 
allowing us to focus on one such model with little loss of generality. We focus on the same 
model that Kilian and Murphy use as the basis for their historical decompositions.  
   There is a strict correspondence between standard reduced-form VAR forecasts and 
forecasts from the structural moving representation. The reduced-form forecast corresponds to 
the expected change in the real price of oil conditional on all future shocks being zero. 
Departures from this benchmark can be constructed by feeding pre-specified sequences of future 
structural shocks into the structural moving-average representation. A forecast scenario is 
defined as a sequence of future structural shocks. The implied movements in the real price of oil 
relative to the baseline forecast obtained by setting all future structural shocks to zero correspond 45 
 
to the revision of the reduced-form forecast implied by this scenario.  
We consider three scenarios of economic interest. The forecast horizon is 24 months for 
illustrative purposes. The first scenario involves a successful stimulus to U.S. oil production, as 
had been considered by the Obama administration prior to the 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of 
Mexico. Here we consider the likely effects of a 20% increase in U.S. crude oil output in 2009.9, 
after the estimation sample of Kilian and Murphy (2010) ends.  This is not to say that such a 
dramatic and sudden increase would be feasible, but that it would be a best-case scenario. Such a 
U.S. oil supply stimulus would translate to a 1.5% increase in world oil production, which is well 
within the variation of historical data. We simulate the effects of such a stimulus by calibrating a 
one-time structural oil supply shock such that the impact response of global oil production 
growth in 2009.9 is 1.5%. All other future structural shocks are set to zero. Figure 9 shows that 
the resulting reduction in the real price of oil expressed in percent relative to the baseline forecast 
is negligible. Even a much larger U.S. oil supply stimulus would do little to affect the forecast of 
the real price of oil, suggesting that policies aimed at creating such a stimulus will be ineffective 
at lowering the real price of oil. 
The second scenario involves a recovery of global demand for oil and other industrial  
commodities. We ask how an unexpected surge in the demand for oil similar to that occurring 
during 2007.1-2008.6, but starting in 2009.9, would affect the real price of oil. This scenario 
involves feeding into the structural moving average representation future flow demand shocks 
corresponding to the sequence of flow demand shocks that occurred in 2007.1-2008.6, while 
setting all other future structural shocks equal to their expected value of zero. Figure 9 shows a 
persistent increase in the real price of oil starting in early 2010 that peaks in early 2011 about 
50% above the price of oil in 2009.8. Taking the no-change forecast as the baseline forecast, this 
means that the peak occurs at a price of about 100 dollars.  Alternatively, one could express these 
results relative to the unconditional VAR forecast. 
Finally, we consider the possibility of a speculative frenzy such as occurred starting in 
mid-1979 after the Iranian Revolution (see Kilian and Murphy 2010). This scenario involves 
feeding into the model future structural shocks corresponding to the sequence of speculative 
demand shocks that occurred between 1979.1 and 1980.2 and were a major contributor to the 
1979/80 oil price shock episode. Figure 9 shows that this event would raise the baseline forecast 
temporarily by as much as 30%. Most of the effects would have dissipated by mid-2011.  46 
 
These results, while necessarily tentative, illustrate how structural models of oil markets 
may be used to assess risks in oil price forecasts and to investigate the sensitivity of reduced- 
form forecasts to specific economic events, possibly in conjunction with the formal risk 
measures discussed in section 12. Conditional projections, of course, are only as good as the 
underlying structural models. Our example highlights the importance of refining these models 
and of improving structural forecasting methods, perhaps in conjunction with Bayesian methods 
of estimating VAR forecasting models. 
 
10. Forecasting the Real Price of Oil in Other Countries 
It is natural to focus on forecasting the real price of oil in dollars because crude oil is traded in  
dollars. This perspective, however, is too limited. From the point of European oil importers, for 
example, it is the real price of oil in Euros that matters. Figure 10 shows the real price of oil 
between 1991.1 and 2009.12 in the U.S., the Euro zone, Japan, the U.K. and Canada. These data 
have been constructed from the U.S. refiners’ acquisition cost for imported crude oil with the 
help of data on nominal exchange rates and consumer prices. For expository purposes all data 
have been expressed in log deviations from their mean over this sample period. Although the 
overall picture is similar, Figure 10 illustrates that there can be substantial differences in the real 
price of oil across countries at times. For example, the real exchange rate cushioned the increase 
in the real price of oil experienced by the Euro area in 2007/08, but amplified it in 2000/01. 
  These differences in the evolution of the real price of oil across countries shown in Figure 
10 suggest that there is no a priori reason to expect the accuracy of alternative forecasting models 
of the real price of oil to be the same across countries. A model that works well for one country 
need not work well for other countries. Table 17 explores this question for Japan, the U.K. and 
Canada.  We focus on the AR(12) model for illustrative purposes. The estimation and evaluation 
periods are the same as in Tables 12 and 14, allowing direct comparisons. The upper panel shows 
results based on the U.S. refiners’ acquisition cost for imported crude oil and the lower panel 
results based on the WTI price. For each country we fit an AR(12) model to the price of oil 
expressed in terms of domestic consumer goods.  These prices are obtained by multiplying the 
U.S. real price of crude oil by the appropriate monthly real exchange rates. The results in the 
upper panel are quite similar to those in Table 12. For all three countries the AR(12) model has 
significantly lower MSPE than the no-change forecast at  horizons 1 and 3 and in some cases at 47 
 
horizon 6 as well. At longer horizons, the no-change forecast is more accurate. The results in the 
lower panel are similar to those in Table 14 in that the evidence against the no-change forecast is 
somewhat weaker. For Japan and Canada the no-change forecast is rejected at horizons 1 and 3, 
but for the U.K. there is no rejection at any horizon. The gains in accuracy, even if statistically 
significant, tend to be smaller than in the upper panel. This example suggests that – subject to the 
earlier caveats – the forecast accuracy gains we documented for the U.S. real price of oil 
continue to hold for other countries. We defer to future work the question of whether the relative 
accuracy of alternative AR and ARMA forecasting methods is the same for other countries as for 
the United States. 
  Extending the VAR approach of section 8 to other countries raises additional 
complications. One simple approach would be to augment the baseline reduced-form forecasting 
model for the real price of oil in dollars by including the real exchange rate. This approach, 
however, may cost too many degrees of freedom in practice. A simple alternative approach is to 
leave unchanged the VAR model, but to convert all forecasts of the real price of oil at the real 
exchange rate as of the date from which the forecasts are generated. This amounts to imposing a 
no-change forecast for the real exchange rate. At short horizons, the real exchange rate is 
dominated by fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate. It is well known that the change in the 
nominal exchange rate is unforecastable in real time. This suggests that the no-change forecast of 
the real exchange rate will provide a good approximation at least at short horizons. The same 
approach may be used in constructing the conditional predictions from structural VAR models 
discussed in section 9, which avoids having to reconsider the identification of the structural VAR 
shocks.  
 
11. The Ability of Oil Prices to Forecast U.S. Real GDP 
One of the main reasons the price of oil is considered important by many macroeconomists is its 
perceived predictive power for U.S. real GDP. Assessing that predictive power requires a joint 
forecasting model for the price of oil and for domestic real activity.  In this section we first 
examine the forecasting accuracy of linear models and then examine a variety of nonlinear 
forecasting models.  The baseline results are for the U.S. refiners’ acquisition cost for imported 
crude oil. Toward the end of the section we discuss how these results are affected by other oil 
price choices. Our discussion draws on results in Kilian and Vigfusson (2010c). 48 
 
11.1. Linear Autoregressive Models 
A natural starting point is a linear VAR(p) model for the real price of oil and for U.S. real GDP 
expressed in quarterly percent changes. The general structure of the model is  1 () tt t x BLx e   , 
where [ , ] , tt t x ry    t r  denotes the log of real price of oil,  t y  the log of real GDP,  is the 
difference operator,  t e the regression error, and 
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The specification of the components of  ( ) B L  marked as  is irrelevant for this forecasting  
model. We determined the lag order of this benchmark model based on a forecast accuracy 
comparison involving all combinations of horizons    1,...,8 h and lag orders    1,...,24 . p The 
AR(4) model for real GDP growth proved to have the lowest MSPE or about the same MSPE as 
the most accurate model at all horizons. The same AR(4) benchmark model has also been used 
by Hamilton (2003) and others, facilitating comparisons with existing results in the literature. 
  We compare the benchmark model with two alternative models. One model is the 


























The restriction  12() 0 BL   is implied by the hypothesis of exogenous oil prices. Although that 
restriction is not literally true, in section 4 we mentioned that in linear models the predictive 
content of U.S. real GDP for the real price of oil, while not zero, appears to be weak.  Thus, a 
natural conjecture is that the added parsimony from imposing zero feedback from lagged real 
GDP to the real price of oil may help reduce the out-of-sample MSPE of multi-step ahead real 
GDP forecasts. 
  The real price of oil is obtained by deflating the refiners’ acquisition cost for imported 
crude oil by the U.S. CPI. All three models are estimated recursively on data starting in 1974.Q1. 49 
 
The initial estimation period ends in 1990.Q1, right before the invasion of Kuwait in August of 
1990. The forecast evaluation ends in 2010.Q2.  The maximum length of the recursive sample is 
restricted by the end of the data and the forecast horizon. We evaluate the MSPE of each model 
for the cumulative growth rates at horizons    1,...,8 , h  corresponding to the horizons of interest 
to policymakers. 
  The first column of Table 18 shows that, at horizons of three quarters and beyond, 
including the real price of oil in the autoregressive models may reduce the MSPE for real GDP 
growth by up to 8% relative to the AR(4) model for real GDP growth.  The unrestricted VAR(4) 
model for the real price of oil is about as accurate as the restricted VAR(4) model in the second 
column. Imposing exogeneity marginally reduces the MSPE at some horizons, but the 
differences are all negligible. This fact is remarkable given the greater parsimony of the model 
with exogenous oil prices. We conclude that there are no significant gains from imposing 
exogeneity in forecasting from linear models. Next consider a similar analysis for the nominal 
price  of oil. Although the use of the nominal price of oil in predicting real GDP is not supported 
by standard economic models, it is useful to explore this alternative approach in light of the 
discussion in section 3. Table 18 shows that the unrestricted VAR(4)  model based on the real 
price of oil is consistently at least as accurate as the same model based on the nominal price of 
oil. We conclude that in linear models there are no gains in forecast accuracy from replacing the 
real price of oil by the nominal price. Imposing exogeneity, as shown in the last column, again 
makes little difference.  
  MSPE ratios are informative about relative forecasting accuracy, but are not informative 
about how accurate these models are in practice. Figure 11 focuses on the ability of recursively 
estimated AR(4) and VAR(4)  models based on the real price of oil imports to predict the 
recessions of 1991, 2001, and 2007/8. The upper panel plots the one-quarter-ahead forecasts 
against the forecast realizations. AR and VAR forecasts are generally quite similar. Neither 
model is able to forecast the large economic declines in 1990/91, 2001, and 2008/09. The 
forecast accuracy deteriorates further at the one-year horizon, as shown in the lower panel. 
One possible explanation is that this forecast failure simply reflects our inability to 
forecast more accurately the real price of oil. Put differently, the explanation could be that the 
real GDP forecasts would be more accurate if only we had more accurate forecasts of the real 
price of oil.  Conditioning on realized values of the future price of oil, however, does not greatly 50 
 
improve the forecast accuracy of the linear VAR model for cumulative real GDP growth, so this 
explanation can be ruled out. An alternative explanation could be that the predictive relationship 
between the price of oil and domestic macroeconomic aggregates is time-varying. One source of 
time variation is that the share of energy in domestic expenditures has varied considerably over 
time. This suggests that we replace the percent change in the real price of oil in the linear VAR 
model by the percent change in the real price of oil weighted by the time-varying share of oil in 
domestic expenditures, building on the analysis in Edelstein and Kilian (2009). Hamilton (2009) 
reported some success in employing a similar strategy.
31 Another source of time variation may 
be changes in the composition of the underlying oil demand and oil supply shocks, as discussed 
in Kilian (2009). Finally, yet another potential explanation investigated below is that the linear 
forecasting model may be inherently misspecified. Of particular concern is the possibility that 
nonlinear dynamic regression models may generate more accurate out-of-sample forecasts of 
cumulative real GDP growth. 
 
11.2. Nonlinear Dynamic Models 
In this regard, Hamilton (2003) suggested that the predictive relationship between oil prices and 
U.S. real GDP is nonlinear in that (1) oil price increases matter only to the extent that they 
exceed the maximum oil price in recent years and that (2) oil price decreases do not matter at all. 
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where  t s denotes the log of the nominal price of oil and 
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  the corresponding 3-year net  
increase in the nominal price of oil.  
Hamilton’s line of reasoning has prompted many researchers to construct asymmetric 
responses to positive and negative oil price innovations from censored oil price VAR models. 
Censored oil price VAR models refer to linear VAR models for 
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31 In related work, Ramey and Vine (2010) propose an alternative adjustment to the price of gasoline that reflects the 
time cost of queuing in gasoline markets during the 1970s. That adjustment as well serves to remove a nonlinearity 
in the transmission process. Both the nonlinearity postulated in Edelstein and Kilian (2009) and that postulated in 
Ramey and Vine (2010) is incompatible with the specific nonlinearity embodied in the models of Mork (1989) and 
Hamilton (1996, 2003). In fact, the aforementioned papers rely on linear regressions after adjusting the energy price 
data. 51 
 
augmented by other variables. Recently, Kilian and Vigfusson (2010a) have shown that impulse 
response estimates from VAR models involving censored oil price variables are inconsistent 
even when equation (18) is correctly specified. Specifically, that paper demonstrated, first, that 
asymmetric models of the transmission of oil price shocks cannot be represented as censored oil 
price VAR models and are fundamentally misspecified whether the data generating process is 
symmetric or asymmetric. This misspecification renders the parameter estimates inconsistent and 
inference invalid. Second, standard approaches to the construction of structural impulse 
responses in this literature are invalid, even when applied to correctly specified models. Instead, 
Kilian and Vigfusson proposed a modification of the procedure discussed in Koop, Pesaran and 
Potter (1996). Third, standard tests for asymmetry based on the slope coefficients of single-
equation predictive models are neither necessary nor sufficient for judging the degree of 
asymmetry in the structural response functions, which is the question of ultimate interest to users 
of these models. Kilian and Vigfusson proposed a direct test of the latter hypothesis and showed 
empirically that there is no statistically significant evidence of asymmetry in the response 
functions for U.S. real GDP.  
Hamilton (2010) agrees with Kilian and Vigfusson on the lack of validity of impulse 
response analysis from censored oil price VAR models, but suggests that nonlinear predictive 
models such as model (18) may still be useful for out-of-sample forecasting. We explore this 
conjecture below. We consider both one-quarter-ahead forecasts of real GDP growth and 
forecasts of the cumulative real GDP growth rate several quarters ahead. The latter forecasts 
require a generalization of the single-equation forecasting approach proposed by Hamilton 
(2010).  In implementing this approach, there are several potentially important modeling choices 
to be made. 
First, even granting the presence of asymmetries in the predictive model, one question is 
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as in Balke, Brown and Yücel (2002) or Herrera, Lagalo and Wada (2010), for example. The 
latter specification encompasses the linear reduced-form model as a special case. Kilian and 
Vigfusson prove that dropping the lagged percent changes from model (19) will cause an 
inconsistency of the OLS estimates, except in the theoretically implausible case that there is no 
lagged feedback from percent changes in the price of oil to real GDP. Hamilton, in contrast, 
argues in effect that  0 , i i     or, alternatively, that the slopes i  are close enough to zero for the 
misspecified (but more parsimonious) nonlinear predictive model (18) to have lower out-of-
sample MSPE  in finite samples than the unrestricted encompassing model (19). This motivation 
for the use of model (18) is new in that heretofore the focus in the literature – including 
Hamilton’s own work – has been on establishing nonlinear predictability in population rather 
than out-of-sample. Hamilton (2010) is, of course, correct that there is a tradeoff between 
estimation variance and bias. Indeed, in many other contexts parsimony has been shown to help 
reduce the out-of-sample MSPE, but no systematic evidence has been presented to make this 
case for this model.  Below we explore the merits of imposing  0 i i    not only in the context of 
single-equation models designed for one-step ahead forecasting, but for multivariate nonlinear 
models as well.  
  A second point of contention is whether nonlinear forecasting models should be specified 
in terms of the nominal price of oil or the real price of oil. For linear models, a strong economic 
case can be made for using the real price of oil. For nonlinear models, the situation is less clear, 
as noted by Hamilton (2010). Because the argument for using net oil price increases is 
behavioral, one specification appears as reasonable as the other. Below we therefore will 
consider models specified in real as well as in nominal oil prices. 
  A third issue that arises only in constructing iterated forecasts for higher horizons is how 
to specify the process governing the price of oil. The case can be made that treating this process 
as exogenous with respect to real GDP might help reduce the out-of-sample MSPE, even if that 
restriction is incorrect. Below we therefore consider specifications with and without imposing 
exogeneity.  
  In Table 19, we investigate whether there are MSPE reductions associated with the use of 
censored oil price variables at horizons    1,...,8 , h  drawing on the analysis in Kilian and 
Vigfusson (2010b, c). For completeness, we also include results for the percent increase 53 
 
specification proposed in Mork (1989), the forecasting performance of which has not been 
investigated to date.  We consider nonlinear models based on the real price of oil as in Kilian and 
Vigfusson and nonlinear models based on the nominal price of oil as in Hamilton (2003). The 
unrestricted  multivariate nonlinear forecasting model takes the form 
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      as in Mork (1989), and I(•) denotes the  
indicator function. Analogous nonlinear forecasting models may be constructed based on the 
nominal price of oil, denoted in logs as  : t s  
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  In addition, we consider a restricted version of models (20) and (20) which imposes the 
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Alternatively, we may restrict the feedback from lagged percent changes in the price of oil, as 
suggested by Hamilton (2003). After imposing 21, 0, i B i    the baseline nonlinear forecasting 
model reduces to: 54 
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             (22) 
Finally, we can combine the restrictions  12, 0 i B i    and  21, 0, i B i    resulting in forecasting 
models (23) and (23): 
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            (23) 
At the one-quarter horizon, real GDP growth forecasts from model (22) and (23) only depend 
on the second equation, which is equivalent to using Hamilton’s model (1). All models are 
estimated by least squares, as is standard in the literature. The forecasts are constructed by Monte 
Carlo integration based on 10,000 draws. The estimation and evaluation periods are the same as 
in Table 18. 
Table 19 displays the MSPE ratios for all eight models by horizon. All results are 
normalized relative to the AR(4) model for real GDP growth. No tests of statistical significance 
have been conducted, given the computational cost of such tests. The first result is that no 
nonlinear model is more accurate than the AR(4) benchmark model at the one-quarter horizon 
except for models (22) and (23). The reduction in MSPE is 9%. At longer horizons, model (23)   
which combines Hamilton’s assumptions with that of exogenous oil prices and embeds all these 55 
 
assumptions in a multivariate dynamic framework, yields even larger gains in accuracy relative 
to the benchmark model. At the one-year horizon, the reduction in MSPE reaches 26% compared 
with 15% for the unrestricted nonlinear model (22). The use of nominal as opposed to real net oil 
price increases (accounting for 11 percentage points by itself) and the omission of lagged percent 
changes in the nominal price of oil (accounting for 4 percentage points by itself) are mainly 
responsible for the additional gain in accuracy; the imposition of exogeneity plays no role. 
Accuracy gains at slightly shorter or longer horizons are closer to 10%.  
Second, neither the percent increase model based on Mork (1989) nor the one-year net 
increase model motivated by Hamilton (1996) is more accurate than the AR(4) benchmark at the 
one-quarter horizon. This is true regardless of whether the price of oil is specified in nominal or 
real terms and regardless of what additional restrictions we impose. At longer horizons, there is 
weak evidence that some of these specifications reduce the MSPE at some horizons, but in no 
case as much as for the three-year net oil price increase. 
Third, there is no clear ranking between forecasting models based on the real price of oil 
and models based on the nominal price of oil. For example, models (22) and (23) based on the 
real price of oil are more accurate at the one-quarter horizon than models (22 )  and (23)  based 
on the nominal price, but at longer horizons the ranking is reversed.  
An obvious question of interest is to what extent allowing for nonlinearities improves our 
ability to forecast major economic downturns in the U.S. The one-quarter ahead results in the 
upper panel of Figure 12 indicate that the nominal net increase model has considerable success in 
forecasting the 2008 recessions, about half of which is forecast by the model, but the model’s 
performance during other episodes is less impressive. For example, its performance during the 
oil price shock episode of 1990/91 is erratic. Although the model forecasts a recession, the 
timing is off and the model forecasts sharp subsequent oscillations in economic growth that did 
not materialize.  
The corresponding lower panel in Figure 12 shows that the net increase model (23) is 
even more successful at forecasting the downturn of 2008 and the subsequent recovery four 
quarters ahead. If anything, this nonlinear model appears too successful in that it seems to leave 
little independent role for the financial crisis. The forecasting success in 2008, however, comes 
at a price because model (23) on earlier occasions forecast a number of economic declines that 
did not materialize or were not nearly as severe as predicted by the model. For example, in panel 56 
 
(b), the net increase model incorrectly forecast pronounced declines in economic growth relative 
to average growth in 2005/06 and the economic decline of 1990/91 began long before the 
forecasted decline. 
Plots of the recursive MSPE of these nonlinear models show that much of the forecasting 
success of nonlinear models is driven by one episode, namely the economic collapse in 2008/09 
following the financial crisis. This point is illustrated in Figure 13. The left panel of Figure 13 is 
based on the nominal PPI used in Hamilton’s original analysis; the right panel shows the 
corresponding results for the nominal refiners’ acquisition cost for crude oil imports. The plot of 
the cumulative recursive MSPE for the PPI model   23  reveals that the overall gain in accuracy 
in this example is driven entirely by the 2008/09 recession. Excluding this episode, model   23  
has higher MSPE than the linear AR model throughout the evaluation period.  Given this 
evidence a strong case can be made that few forecasters would have had the courage to stick with 
the predictions of this nonlinear model given the sustained failure of the model in the years 
leading up to the financial crisis. 
The corresponding results for the refiners’ acquisition cost for imported crude oil in the 
right panel are somewhat more favorable, but reveal the same tendency of the net oil price 
increase model to have a higher recursive MSPE than the AR(4) benchmark model for real GDP 
growth throughout much of the pre-crisis period. Both in 1990 and between 1998 and 2008 the 
nonlinear forecasting model proved persistently less accurate out of sample than the AR(4) 
benchmark. Only in 2009 is that ranking reversed again in favor of the nonlinear model. Given 
that the financial crisis occurred immediately after a major surge in the price of oil, but itself was 
presumably not caused by that oil price surge, the obvious concern is that the nonlinear model 
may have forecast the 2008 recession for the wrong reasons.  
It is usually thought that out-of-sample forecasts protect against overfitting. The example 
of 2008/09 illustrates that this need not be the case. Under quadratic loss the ability of the 
nonlinear model to predict correctly the sharp economic decline associated with the financial 
crisis may more than offset the sustained poor forecasting accuracy of this nonlinear model 
during earlier episodes not involving smaller forecasting errors. Only additional data will 
ultimately resolve this question. If the near-simultaneous occurrence of the financial crisis and 
the oil price surge is coincidental, then the forecasting accuracy of the nonlinear model can be 
expected to worsen, as the sample is extended. If the forecasting success of the nonlinear model 57 
 
were to persist even after the financial crisis is over, this would add credibility to the nonlinear 
real GDP growth forecasts. 
The same concern regarding the financial crisis episode arises to varying degrees with 
other oil price series. Table 20 provides a systematic comparison of the performance of nonlinear 
forecasting models relative to the AR(4) benchmark model for real GDP growth for different oil 
price series and evaluation periods. To conserve space, we focus on models (23) and (23)  which 
tend to be the most accurate nonlinear forecasting models. Table 20 shows that the relative 
MSPE of nonlinear forecasting models can be highly sensitive to the choice of oil price series.  
The first two columns of Table 20 focus on the evaluation period 1990.Q1-2010.Q2. Column (1) 
shows that, for eight of ten model specifications, the one-quarter ahead nonlinear forecasting 
model proposed by Hamilton (2010) fails to outperform the AR(4) benchmark model for real 
GDP. Only for the real refiners’ acquisition cost for imported crude oil and for the nominal WTI 
specification are there any gains in forecast accuracy. In particular, the nominal PPI specification 
favored by Hamilton (2010) on the basis of in-sample diagnostics is less accurate than the AR 
benchmark model. Much more favorable results are obtained at the one-year horizon in column 
(2) of Table 20. All but one nonlinear forecasting model yields reductions in the MSPE, although 
the extent of these reductions greatly differs across models and can range from negligible to 
substantial.  However, all evidence of forecast accuracy gains vanishes if the financial crisis 
episode is excluded, as shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 20. Some nonlinear forecasting 
models have more than twice the MSPE of the AR benchmark model. We conclude that the 
evidence that nonlinear oil price transformation help forecast cumulative U.S. real GDP growth 
is mixed at best.   
The results in Tables 19 and 20 were constructed from fully revised data that would not 
have been available to forecasters in real time. As in our analysis of real oil price forecasts, an 
obvious additional question would be how the results of the forecast accuracy comparison for 
U.S. real GDP growth would have changed, had we only used data sets actually available as of 
the time the forecast is generated. This remains an open question at this point.
32  
                                                            
32 Some preliminary evidence on this question has been provided by Ravazzolo and Rothman (2010) and by Carlton 
(2010). It is not straightforward to compare their results to those in Tables 19 and 20, however. Not only is their 
analysis based on one-step-ahead real GDP growth forecasts from single-equation predictive models evaluated at the 
relevant forecasting horizon (rather than iterated forecasts from multivariate models), but it is based on a sample 
period that includes pre-1973 data. 
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11.3. Nonparametric Approaches 
Our approach in this section has been parametric. Alternatively, one could have used 
nonparametric econometric models to investigate the forecasting ability of the price of oil for 
real GDP.  In related work, Bachmeier, Li and Liu (2008) used the integrated conditional 
moment test of Corradi and Swanson (2002, 2007) to investigate whether oil prices help forecast 
real GDP growth one-quarter ahead. The advantage of this approach is that – while imposing 
linearity under the null – it allows for general nonlinear models under the alternative; the 
disadvantage is that the test is less powerful than the parametric approach if the parametric 
structure is known.  Bachmeier et al. report a p-value of 0.20 for the null that nominal net 
increases in the WTI price of oil do not help forecast U.S. real GDP. The p-value for percent 
changes in the WTI price of crude oil is 0.77. Similar results are obtained for real net increases 
and for percent changes in the real WTI price. These findings are broadly consistent with ours. 
Bachmeier et al. (2008) also report qualitatively similar results using a number of fully 
nonparametric approaches. An obvious caveat is that their analysis is based on data since 1949, 
which is not appropriate for the reasons discussed earlier, and ends before the 2008/09 recession. 
Using their nonparametric techniques on our much shorter sample period does not seem 
advisable, however, because there is no way of controlling the size of the test. 
 
12. The Role of Oil Price Volatility 
Point forecasts of the price of oil are important, but they fail to convey the uncertainty associated 
with oil price forecasts. That uncertainty is captured by the predictive density.  Figure 14 plots 
the 12-month ahead predictive density for the real price of oil as of 2009.12, generated from the 
no-change forecasting model. Although it is obvious that there is tremendous uncertainty about 
the future real price of oil, even when using the best available forecasting methods, it is less 
obvious how to convey and interpret that information. For example, standard questions in the 
financial press about whether the price of oil could increase to $200 a barrel, at the risk of being 
misunderstood, inevitably and always must be answered in the affirmative because the predictive 
distribution has infinite support. That answer, however, is vacuous because it does not convey 
how likely such an event is or by how much the price of oil is expected to exceed the $200 
threshold in that event. 
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12.1. Nominal Oil Price Volatility 
One seemingly natural way of summarizing the information in the predictive distribution is to 
report the variability of the forecasts. Interest in oil price volatility measures arises, for example, 
from financial analysts interested in pricing options and from portfolio managers interested in 
diversifying risks. Given that at short horizons CPI inflation is negligible, it is customary in 
financial applications to focus on nominal oil price volatility. One approach to measuring oil 
price volatility is to rely on the implied volatilities of put and call options, which are available 
from January 1989 on. Implied volatility measures are computed as the arithmetic average of the 
daily implied volatilities from the put and call options associated with a futures contract of a 
given maturity. The upper panel of Figure 15 shows the 1-month implied volatility time series 
for 2001.1-2009.12, computed from daily CRB data, following the same procedure as for the 
spot and futures prices in section 5. Alternatively, we may use daily percent changes in the 
nominal WTI price of oil to construct measures of realized volatility, as shown in the second 
panel of Figure 15 (see, e.g., Bachmeier, Li and Liu 2008).  Finally, yet another measure of 
volatility can be constructed from parametric GARCH or stochastic volatility models. The 
bottom panel of Figure 15 shows the 1-month-ahead conditional variance obtained from 
recursively estimated Gaussian GARCH(1,1) models.
33 The initial estimation period is 1974.1-
2000.12. The estimates are based on the percent change in the nominal WTI price; the 
corresponding results for the real WTI price are almost indistinguishable at the 1-month 
horizon.
34  
Figure 15 plots all three volatility measures on the same scale. Although all three 
measures agree that by far the largest volatility peak occurred near the end of 2008, there are 
important differences. For example, the implied volatility measure increases steadily starting in 
early 2008 and peaks in December 2008. Realized volatility also peaks in December 2008, but 
does not increase substantially the second half of 2008.  Finally, GARCH volatility is even 
                                                            
33 The standard GARCH model is used for illustrative purposes. An alternative would be a GARCH-in-Mean model. 
Given that oil is only one of many assets handled by portfolio managers, however, it is not clear that the GARCH-
in-Mean model for single-asset markets is appropriate in this context, while more general multivariate GARCH 
models are all but impossible to estimate reliably on the small samples available for our purposes (see, e.g., 
Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner 1992). 
34 We deliberately focus on oil price volatility at the 1-month horizon. Although from an economic point of view 
volatility forecasting at longer horizons would be of great interest, the sparsity of options price data makes it 
difficult to extend the implied volatility approach to longer horizons. Likewise, GARCH volatility estimates quickly 
converge to the unconditional variance at longer horizons. 60 
 
slower to increase in 2008 and only peaks in January 2009. This ranking is consistent with the 
view that implied volatility is the most forward-looking volatility measure and GARCH volatility 
the most backward-looking volatility estimate (and hence the least representative measure of real 
time volatility).  Similarly, the implied volatility and realized volatility measures indicate 
substantial secondary spikes in volatility in 2001/02 and 2003, whereas the spikes in the GARCH 
volatility estimate are much smaller and occur only with a delay.  
  It may seem that fluctuations in oil price volatility, defined in this manner, would be a 
good indicator of changes in oil price risks. It is important not to equate risk and uncertainty, 
however. Whereas the latter may be captured by the volatility of oil price forecasts, the former 
cannot. The standard risk that financial markets in oil-importing economies are concerned with is 
the risk of excessively high oil prices. That risk in general will be at best weakly correlated with 
the volatility of oil price forecasts because any reduction in risk, as the price of oil falls, all else 
equal, will be associated with increased oil price volatility. This is why in 1986, for example, oil 
price volatility increased, as OPEC collapsed and the price of oil dropped sharply, whereas by all 
accounts consumers were pleased with lower oil prices and the diminished risk of an OPEC 
induced supply disruption. Hence, standard volatility measures are of limited use as summary 
statistics for the predictive distribution of oil price forecasts. We defer to section 12.3 for a more 
detailed exposition of how appropriate risk measures may be computed from the predictive 
distribution of the price of oil. 
 
12.2. Real Oil Price Volatility 
Interest in the volatility of oil prices also has been prompted by research aimed at establishing a 
direct link from oil price volatility to business cycle fluctuations in the real economy. For 
example, Bernanke (1983) and  Pindyck (1991) showed that the uncertainty of the price of oil 
(measured by the volatility of the price of oil) matters for investment decisions if firms 
contemplate an irreversible investment, the cash flow of which depends on the price of oil. An 
analogous argument holds for consumers considering the purchase of energy-intensive durables 
such as cars. Real options theory implies that, all else equal, an increase in expected volatility 
will cause marginal investment decisions to be postponed, causing a reduction in investment 
expenditures. Kellogg (2010) provides evidence that such mechanisms are at work in the Texas 
oil industry, for example.  61 
 
Unlike in empirical finance, the relevant volatility measure in these models is the 
volatility of the real price of oil at horizons relevant to purchase and investment decisions, which 
is typically measured in years or even decades rather than days or months, making standard 
measures of short-term nominal price volatility inappropriate. Measuring the volatility of the real 
price of oil at such long forecast horizons is inherently difficult given how short the available 
time series are, and indeed researchers in practice have typically asserted rather than measured 
these shifts in real price volatility or they have treated short-horizon volatility as a proxy for 
longer-horizon volatility (see, e.g., Elder and Serletis 2010).
35 This approach is unlikely to work. 
Standard monthly or quarterly GARCH model cannot be used to quantify changes in the longer-
run expected volatility of the real price of oil because GARCH forecasts of the conditional 
variance quickly revert to their time invariant unconditional expectation, as the forecasting 
horizon increases. If volatility at the economically relevant horizon is constant by construction, it 
cannot explain variation in real activity over time, suggesting that survey data may be better 
suited for characterizing changes in forecast uncertainty over time. Some progress in this 
direction may be expected from ongoing work conducted by Anderson, Kellogg and Sallee 
(2010) based on the distribution of Michigan consumer expectations of 5-year-ahead gasoline 
prices. For further discussion of this point also see Kilian and Vigfusson (2010b). 
 
12.3. Quantifying Oil Price Risks 
Although oil price volatility shifts play an important role in discussions of the impact of oil price 
shocks, it is important to keep in mind that volatility measures are not in general useful measures 
of the price risks faced by either producers or consumers of crude oil (or of refined products).  
Consider an oil producer capable of producing crude oil from existing wells as long as the price 
of oil exceeds his marginal cost of $25 a barrel. One risk faced by that oil producer is that he will 
go out of business if the price of oil falls below that threshold. Excessively high oil prices, in 
contrast, are of no concern until they reach the point of making replacement technologies 
economically viable. That might be the case at a threshold of $120 a barrel, for example, at 
                                                            
35 In rare cases, the relevant forecast horizon may be short enough for empirical analysis. For example, Kellogg 
(2010) makes the case that for the purpose of drilling oil wells in Texas, as opposed to Saudi Arabia, a forecast 
horizon of only 18 months is adequate. Even at that horizon, however, there are no oil-futures options price data that 
would allow the construction of implied volatility measures. Kellogg (2010) therefore converts the one-month 
volatility to 18-month volatilities based on the term structure of oil futures. That approach relies on the assumption 
that oil futures prices are reliable predictors of future oil prices. 62 
 
which price major oil producers risk inducing the large-scale use of alternative technologies with 
adverse consequences for the long-run price of crude oil.
36 Thus, the oil producer will care about 
the risk of the price of oil not being contained in the range between $25 and $120, and the extent 
to which he is concerned with violations of that range depends on his risk aversion, which need 
not be symmetric in either direction.
37 There is no reason why oil producers should necessarily 
be concerned with a measure of the variability of the real price of oil. In fact, it can be shown 
that risk measures are not only quantitatively different from volatility measures, but in practice 
may move in the opposite direction. 
  Likewise, a consumer of retail motor gasoline (and hence indirectly of crude oil) is likely 
to be concerned with the price of gasoline exceeding what he can afford to spend each month 
(see Edelstein and Kilian 2009). The threshold at which consumers might trade in their SUV for 
a more energy-efficient car is near $3 a gallon perhaps. The threshold at which commuters may 
decide to relocate closer to their place of work might be at a price near $5 a gallon. The 
possibility that the price of gasoline could fall below $2, in contrast, is of comparatively little 
consequence to consumers’ economic choices, making the volatility of oil prices and related 
statistics such as the value at risk irrelevant to the typical consumer. 
  In both examples above, the appropriate specification of these agents’ decision problem 
is in terms of upside and downside price risks. The literature on risk management postulates that 
risk measures must satisfy two basic requirements. One requirement is that the measure of risk 
must be related to the probability distribution  () F  of the random variable of interest; the other 
requirement is that it must be linked to the preferences of the user, typically parameterized by a 
loss function (see Machina and Rothschild 1987). Except in special cases these requirements rule 
out commonly used measures of risk based on the predictive distribution alone such as the 
sample moments, sample quantiles or the value at risk. In deriving appropriate risk measures that 
characterize the predictive distribution for the real price of oil, it is useful to start with the loss 
function. A reasonably general class of loss functions  () l  that encompasses the two empirical 
examples above is: 
                                                            
36 A similar irreversible shift in OECD demand occurred after the oil price shocks of the 1970s when fuel oil was 
increasingly replaced by natural gas. The fuel oil market never recovered, even as the price of this fuel fell 
dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s (see Dargay and Gately 2010). 
37 The threshold of $120 in this example follows from adjusting the cost estimates for shale oil production in Farrell 
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where  th R  denotes the real price of oil in dollars hperiods from date  , t  01 a  is the weight 
attached to downside risks, and  0    and  0    measure the user’s degree of risk aversion. 
Risks are associated with the event of  th R   exceeding an upper threshold of R or falling below 
the lower threshold of  . R  It can be shown that under this loss function, the expected loss is a 
weighted average of upside and downside risks of the form 
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are the downside risk and upside risk, respectively. This definition encompasses a variety of risk 
definitions familiar from the finance literature. For example, for the special case of  0     
these expressions reduce to the (target) probabilities  0 Pr( ) th DR R R     and 
0 Pr( ) th UR R R    and for the special case of 1      they reduce to the tail conditional 
expectations  1 (|) P r () th th th DR E R R R R R R     and  1 (|) th th UR E R R R R    
Pr( ). th R R    Note that the latter definition not only is concerned with the likelihood of a tail 
event, but also with how far the real price of oil is expected to be in the tail. The latter term is 
also known as the expected shortfall (or expected excess). The expectations and probabilities in 
question in practice can be estimated by their sample equivalent.
38  
  This digression highlights that the volatility of the real price of oil in general is not the 
relevant statistic for the analysis of risks. In particular, if and only if the loss function is quadratic 
and symmetric about zero, the variance of the price of oil about zero provides an adequate 
summary statistic for the risk in oil price forecasts. Even that target variance, however, is distinct 
                                                            
38 Measures of risk of this type were first introduced by Fishburn (1977), Holthausen (1981), Artzner, Delbaen, Eber 
and Heath (1999), and Basak and Shapiro (2001) in the context of portfolio risk management and have become a 
standard tool in recent years (see, e.g., Engle and Brownlees 2010). For a general exposition of risk measures and 
risk management in a different context see Kilian and Manganelli (2007, 2008). 64 
 
from conventionally used measures of oil price volatility, defined as the variance about the 
sample mean of the predictive distribution. The latter measure under no circumstances can be 
interpreted as a risk measure because it depends entirely on the predictive distribution of the 
price of oil and not at all on the user’s preferences. 
  Risk measures can be computed for any predictive distribution. The construction of the 
predictive distribution from regression forecasting models typically relies on bootstrap methods 
applied to the sequence of forecast errors obtained from fitting the forecasting model to historical 
data. This requires the forecast errors to be serially uncorrelated, as would typically be the case 
in forecasting models at horizon h = 1.  For example, when fitting a random walk model of the 
form  11 tt t ss    , the forecast errors at horizon 1 may be resampled using standard bootstrap 
methods for homoskedastic or conditionally heteroskedastic data (see, e.g., Gonçalves and Kilian 
2004).  
At longer horizons, one option is to fit the forecasting model on nonoverlapping 
observations and proceed as for h = 1. This approach is simple, but may involve a considerable 
reduction in estimation precision. For example, in constructing the predictive distribution of one-
year-ahead no-change forecasts from monthly data, one would construct for the current month 
the sequence of year-on-year percent changes relative to the same month in the preceding year 
and approximate the predictive distribution by resampling this sequence of year-on-year forecast 
errors. The other option is to construct forecast errors from overlapping observations and to 
recover the underlying white noise errors by fitting an MA(h-1) process to the sequence of h-
step- ahead forecast errors. This allows the construction of bootstrap approximations of the 
predictive density by first resampling the serially uncorrelated white noise residuals using 
suitable bootstrap methods such as the wild bootstrap and then constructing bootstrap replicates 
of the h-month-ahead forecast errors from the implied moving averages. The risk measures are 
constructed directly from the bootstrap estimate of the predictive distribution, as discussed 
above. Below we implement this approach in the context of a 12-month-ahead no-change 
forecast of the real WTI price of oil. 
  Figure 16 plots the risk that the price of oil (expressed in 2009.12 dollars) exceeds $80 
one year later ( 80) R   and the risk that it drops below $45 one year later (4 5 ) . R   These 
thresholds have been chosen for illustrative purposes. The upper panel of Figure 16 plots the 
upside and downside risks for  0,   whereas the lower panel plots the corresponding results 65 
 
for 1.     Note that by convention the downside risks have been defined as a negative 
number to improve the readability of the plots. Although the upside risks and downside risks 
respond to sustained changes in the conditional mean forecast by construction, the relationship is 
not one-for-one.  Figure 16 shows that the ex ante probability of the real price of oil exceeding 
$80 one year later was small except during 2005-08 and after mid-2009; high probabilities of the 
real price of oil falling below $45 occurred only in 2001-04 and 2009.  The lower panel shows 
the corresponding tail conditional expectations. Allowing for some risk aversion in the form of 
1,     the upside risks in 2007-08 become disproportionately larger relative to earlier upside 
risks and relative to the downside risks. Regardless of the choice of   and  ,   the balance of 
risks since mid-2009 has been tilted in the upside direction. Recent upside risks are comparable 
to those in 2006.  
  It is immediately evident that the three standard volatility measures in Figure 15 are not 
good proxies for either of the two risks shown in Figure 16. For example, in the second half of 
2008 volatility skyrockets while the upside risk plummets. The upside risk peaks in mid-2008, 
when the real price of oil peaked, but volatility only peaks in December 2008 or January 2009, 
when the real price of oil had reached a trough, much to the relief of oil consumers. Moreover, 
the spikes in volatility in 2001/02 and 2003 are not mirrored by increases in upside risk, while 
the sustained increase in upside risk after 2004 is not mirrored by a sustained increase in 
volatility. Nor is volatility systematically related to downside oil price risks. Although both 
downside risks and volatility peak in 2001/02, the sustained increase in volatility in early and 
mid-2008 is not mirrored by an increase in downside risk. Furthermore, the decline in downside 
risks during 2004 and 2005 is not reflected in systematic changes in volatility. 
It is worth emphasizing that none of these 12-month-ahead risk forecasts provided any 
warning of the collapse of the real price of oil in late 2008. To the extent that the collapse in the 
real price of oil was unpredictable based on past data, this is not surprising. The problem is not 
with the risk measures but rather with the underlying predictive distribution that these risk 
measures have been applied to. Although the predictive distribution based on the no-change 
forecast is among the best available approaches to forecasting the real price of oil, this is a useful 




13. Avenues for Future Research  
There are a number of directions for future research on forecasting oil prices. One relates to the 
use of additional industry-level predictors not commonly considered by economists. Although 
crude oil is one of the more homogeneous commodities traded in global markets, not all 
refineries may process all grades of crude oil. Moreover, different grades of crude oil yield 
different mixes of refined products. Hence, shifts in the demand for one type of refined product, 
say, diesel fuel, have implications for the product mix of refined products (diesel, gasoline, 
kerosene, heating oil, etc.) and hence for the demand for different grades of crude oil, depending 
on the capacity utilization rates of different refineries. Situations can arise in which excess 
demand for one grade of crude oil may result in rising prices, while excess supply of another 
grade of crude oil is associated with falling prices. Models that incorporate information about 
such spreads or about the underlying determinants of demand have the potential of improving 
forecasts of the price of a given grade of crude oil. 
  A second issue of interest is the role played by heterogenous oil price and gasoline price 
expectations in modeling the demand for energy-intensive durables (see Anderson, Kellogg and 
Sallee 2010). There is strong evidence that not all households share the same expectations, 
casting doubt on standard rational expectations models with homogeneous agents. This also calls 
into question the use of a single price forecast in modeling purchasing decisions in the aggregate. 
This problem is compounded to the extent that different market participants (households, 
refiners, oil producers) in the same model may have very different risk assessments based on the 
same predictive oil price distribution. Both of these effects may undermine the predictive power 
of the price of oil for macroeconomic aggregates as well as the explanatory power of theoretical 
models based on oil price forecasts. 
  Third, we have deliberately refrained from exploring the use of factor models for 
forecasting the price of oil. In related work, Zagaglia (2010) reports some success in using a 
factor model in forecasting the nominal price of oil at short horizons, although his evaluation 
period is limited to early 2003 to early 2008, given the data limitations, and it is unclear how 
sensitive the results would be to extending the evaluation period. An obvious concern is that 
there are no price reversals over the evaluation period, so any predictor experiencing sustained 
growth is likely to have some forecasting power. Moreover, we have shown in section 5 that 
much simpler forecasting models appear capable of generating equally substantial reductions in 67 
 
the MSPE of the nominal price of oil at short horizons and do so for extended periods. The more 
important problem from an economic point of view, in any case, is forecasting the real price of 
oil. It seems unlikely that approximate factor models could be used to forecast the real price of 
oil. The variables that matter most for the determination of the real price of oil are global. Short 
of developing a comprehensive worldwide data set of real aggregates at monthly frequency, it is 
not clear whether there are enough predictors available for reliable real-time estimation of the 
factors. For example, drawing excessively on U.S. real aggregates as in Zagaglia (2010) is 
unlikely to be useful for forecasting the global price of oil for the reasons discussed in section 4.  
Using a cross-section of data on energy prices, quantities, and other oil-market related indicators 
may be more promising, but almost half of the series used by Zagaglia are specific to the United 
States and unlikely to be representative of global markets.  
 
14. Conclusions 
Although there are a fair number of papers dealing with the problem of predicting the price of 
oil, it is difficult to reconcile the seemingly conflicting results in this literature. The problem is 
not only the precise definition of the oil price variable, but whether the price of oil is expressed 
in nominal or in real terms, what estimation and evaluation periods are chosen, how forecast 
accuracy is evaluated, whether the conditional mean, conditional variance or conditional density 
is being forecast, whether the analysis is conducted in-sample or out-of-sample, whether the 
methods are parametric or nonparametric, and whether tests of statistical significance are 
provided or not. The most common problem in the literature is that results are sensitive to the 
choice of sample period and vanish when the sample period is extended. 
  In this chapter, our objective has been to provide a benchmark based on data that include 
the recent collapse of the price of oil in 2008 and its subsequent recovery. We started by 
discussing problems with combining data from the pre-1973 and post-1973 period, highlighting 
the need to discard the pre-1973 data because these data cannot be represented by standard time 
series models. We documented a structural break in the time series process of both the nominal 
and the real price of oil in late 1973. We also noted the presence of a structural break in the 
dynamic correlations between changes in the real price of oil and U.S. real GDP growth. That 
structural break invalidates predictive regressions based on data extending back further than 
1973.  68 
 
  A natural starting point for our analysis was the question of whether the price of oil is 
inherently unpredictable, as is sometimes claimed. We provided strong evidence that after 1973 
the nominal price of oil is predictable in population, consistent with economic theory. The most 
successful predictors are recent percent changes in U.S. consumer prices and monetary 
aggregates as well as global non-oil industrial commodity prices. An even better predictor is the 
recent percent change in the bilateral dollar exchange rate of major commodity exporters. 
  We also found strong evidence that after 1973 the real price of oil is predictable in 
population based on fluctuations in global real output, as suggested by standard economic theory. 
We illustrated how problems of omitted variables and of mismeasurement can obscure this 
predictive relationship. We emphasized the importance of accounting for structural changes in 
the composition of real output, of using measures with broad geographic coverage, and of using 
methods of detrending that can capture long swings in the demand for industrial commodities.  
  These results demonstrate that neither the nominal nor the real price of oil follows a 
random walk. Predictability in population need not translate into out-of-sample forecast 
accuracy, however. One concern is that in small samples simple parsimonious forecasting 
models such as the no-change forecast often have lower MSPE than forecasts from larger-
dimensional models suggested by economic theory. This may occur even if the large-
dimensional model is correctly specified, provided the increase in the forecast variance from 
estimating the unknown parameters of the correctly specified model exceeds the reduction in the 
(squared) forecast bias from eliminating the model misspecification.  
We provided evidence that at horizons up to six months suitably designed unrestricted 
vector autoregressive models estimated recursively on ex-post revised data tend to be more 
accurate out of sample than the no-change forecast of the real price of oil. There also is strong 
evidence that recursively estimated AR and ARMA models have lower MSPE than the no-
change forecast, especially at horizons of 1 and 3 months. At longer horizons, the no-change 
forecast of the real price of oil typically is the predictor with the lowest MSPE. These results are 
robust to the use of real time data. 
  Forecasting the nominal price of oil is a comparatively easier task. There is strong 
evidence of statistically significant MSPE reductions in forecasting the nominal price of oil at 
horizons of 1 and 3 months based on recent percent changes in the price of non-oil industrial raw 
materials, for example. The gains in accuracy at the 3-month horizon are 22%. There also is 69 
 
evidence that simply adjusting the no-change forecast for the real price of oil for expected 
inflation yields much more accurate forecasts of the nominal price of oil than the no-change 
forecast at horizons of several years. There is no evidence against the no-change forecast for the 
nominal price of oil at intermediate horizons, however.  
More commonly used methods of forecasting the nominal price of oil based on the price 
of oil futures or the spread of the oil futures price relative to the spot price cannot be 
recommended. There is no reliable evidence that oil futures prices significantly lower the MSPE 
relative to the no-change forecast at short horizons, and long-term futures prices often cited by 
policymakers are distinctly less accurate than the no-change forecast. One possible explanation 
for the unexpectedly low out-of-sample accuracy of oil futures-based forecasts may be the 
presence of transaction costs impeding arbitrage. An alternative forecasting strategy in which 
one uses the futures price only if the futures spread exceeds 5% in absolute terms and uses the 
spot price otherwise, yields MSPE reductions between 0% and 6% at short horizons (some of 
which are statistically significant), but performs much worse than the no-change forecast at 
longer horizons. Likewise professional and government forecasts of the nominal price of oil do 
not significantly improve on the no-change forecast, except in some cases in the very short run, 
and can be much less accurate.  
One of the main reasons for the importance that many macroeconomists attach to the 
price of oil is its perceived predictive power for U.S. real GDP. Assessing that predictive power 
requires a joint forecasting model for the price of oil and for domestic real activity. We showed 
that there are only small gains in using the price of oil in forecasting cumulative real GDP 
growth from VAR models. This finding is robust to whether the price of oil is specified in 
nominal or in real terms and whether it is treated as exogenous or endogenous. More 
importantly, linear autoregressive models fail to predict major economic downturns. One 
possible explanation of this forecast failure is that the predictive relationship is nonlinear. We 
therefore evaluated and compared a wide range of nonlinear joint forecasting models for the 
price of oil and real GDP growth. Except for the three-year net oil price increase specification, 
we found no evidence at all of substantially improved forecast accuracy for real GDP growth. 
Even for the three-year net increase model, the evidence was mixed at best. For example, we 
found no evidence that the nominal PPI three-year net increase model is more accurate than 
linear models for real GDP growth at the one-quarter horizon. A multivariate generalization of 70 
 
the model proposed by Hamilton (2003, 2010) tended to provide MSPE gains of up to 12% 
relative to the AR(4) benchmark model at longer horizons. Even more accurate results were 
obtained with some alternative oil price series. All these forecasting successes, however, were 
driven entirely by the 2008/09 recession. Excluding that episode from the evaluation period, 
even the most accurate nonlinear model was less accurate than the benchmark AR(4) model for 
real GDP growth.   
We showed that there is reason to be skeptical of the seeming forecasting success of 
many nonlinear models during the recent financial crisis. In particular, if the one-year forecasts 
are to be believed, the financial crisis played almost no role in the economic decline of 2008/09, 
which does not seem economically plausible. An alternative explanation is that the evaluation 
sample is too short for reliable inference and that these results reflect overfitting. We observed 
that net oil price increase models have a tendency to predict major economic declines anytime 
the price of oil has increased substantially. Although such predictions repeatedly proved 
incorrect, most notably in 2005/06, the ability of some three-year net increase models to forecast 
the extreme decline of 2008/09 under quadratic loss more than compensates for  earlier 
forecasting errors and accounts for the higher average out-of-sample forecast accuracy of these 
models for U.S. real GDP growth.  
We also discussed the use of structural forecasting models for the real price of oil. An 
important limitation of reduced-form forecasting models of the real price of oil from a policy 
point of view is that they provide no insight into what is driving the forecast and do not allow the 
policymaker to explore alternative hypothetical forecasting scenarios. We illustrated how 
recently developed structural vector autoregressive models of the global oil market not only 
generate quite accurate out-of-sample forecasts, but may be used to generate projections of how 
the oil price forecast would deviate from the unconditional baseline forecast, conditional on 
alternative economic scenarios such as a surge in speculative demand similar to previous 
historical episodes, a resurgence of the global business cycle, or increased U.S. oil production. 
The proposed method allows users to assess the risks associated with reduced-form oil price 
forecasts. 
Finally, we showed that oil price volatility measures commonly used to characterize 
predictive densities for the price of oil are not adequate measures of the risks faced by market 
participants. We demonstrated how appropriate risk measures can be constructed. Those risk 71 
 
measures, however, are only as good as the underlying forecasting models and would not have 
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NOTES: WTI stands for the West Texas Intermediate price of crude oil and RAC for the U.S. refiners’ acquisition cost. 81 
 


















































































































NOTES: Log scale. See Figure 1. 82 
 





























































































NOTES: See Figure 1. 83 
 






























Random Draw from Fitted Model






























NOTES: The fitted model is a random walk with drift in logs. The fitted values have been exponentiated. The figure illustrates that – 
unlike the original data – the data generated at random from the fitted model will never remain unchanged for extended periods of 
time.  Hence, the class of ARMA processes is not suitable for modeling this data set. 84 
 


















































































































NOTES: Computations by the authors based on CRB data.85 
 





























Expected price 5 years from now
Current price
Expected real price 5 years from now
Current price
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Actual price 5 years from now































NOTES: Computations by the authors based on Michigan Consumer Survey Expectations, SPF 10-year CPI inflation forecasts, and 
EIA data for the city average of retail motor gasoline prices. This analysis draws on Anderson, Kellogg and Sallee (2010). 86 
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    NOTES: Computations by the authors based on data from Consensus Economics Inc. 87 
 




















































































NOTES:  The quarterly price forecasts were collected manually from the EIA’s Short-Term Economic Outlook and compared with the 
ex-post realizations of the average quarterly nominal refiners’ acquisition cost for imported crude oil. The plot shows the price 












































Figure 9: Forecasting Scenarios for the Real Price of Oil based on the Structural VAR Model of Kilian and Murphy (2010) 




























NOTES: All results are based on the structural oil market model of Kilian and Murphy (2010). The U.S. oil production stimulus 
involves a 20% increase in U.S. oil production in 2009.9, which translates to a 1.5% increase in world oil production. For this purpose, 
a one-time structural oil supply shock is calibrated such that the impact response of global oil production is 1.5%. The 2007-08 world 
recovery scenario involves feeding in as future shocks the sequence of flow demand shocks that occurred in 2007.1-2008.6. The Iran 
1979 speculation scenario involves feeding in as future shocks the speculative demand shocks that occurred between 1979.1 and 
1980.2 and were a major contributor to the 1979/80 oil price shock episode. 89 
 







































































NOTES: Computations by the authors based on the U.S. refiners’ acquisition cost for imported crude oil.90 
 






































































Figure 11: Autoregressive Forecasts of Cumulative Real GDP Growth based on the Real Price of Oil 
































NOTES: The benchmark model is an AR(4) for real GDP growth. The alternative is an unrestricted linear VAR(4) model for real GDP 
growth and the percent change in the real price of oil. The price of oil is defined as the U.S. refiners’ acquisition cost for imports.91 
 

































3-Year Nominal Net Increase Forecast
3-Year Real Net Increase Forecast

































3-Year Nominal Net Increase Forecast
3-Year Real Net Increase Forecast
Figure 12: Nonlinear Forecasts of Cumulative Real GDP Growth from Models (23) and (23) 































NOTES: One forecasting model is a suitably restricted VAR(4) model for real GDP growth and the percent change in the real price of 
oil augmented by four lags of the 3-year real net oil price increase. The other model is a similarly restricted VAR(4) model for real 
GDP growth and the percent change in the nominal price of oil augmented by four lags of the 3-year nominal net oil price increase. 92 
 
































Forecast Based on 3-Year Net Oil Price Increase



























































Forecast Based on 3-Year Net Oil Price Increase



























Figure 13: Nonlinear Forecasts of Cumulative Real GDP Growth from Model (23)    
    






























NOTES: The nonlinear forecasting model is a suitably restricted VAR(4) model for real GDP growth and the percent change  
in the nominal price of crude oil augmented by four lags of the corresponding 3-year nominal net oil price increase. 93 
 










Figure 14: 12-Month Ahead Predictive Density of the Real WTI Price of Oil as of 2009.12 
Based on No-Change Forecast 
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NOTES: The GARCH volatility estimate is for the percent change in the nominal WTI price. The realized volatility was obtained 
from daily WTI prices. The implied volatility measure refers to the arithmetic average of the daily implied volatilities from at-the-
money put and call options associated with 1-month oil futures contracts and was constructed by the authors from CRB data. All 
volatility estimates are monthly and expressed as standard deviations, following the convention in the literature.95 
 



























Figure 16: 12-Month Ahead Upside and Downside Risks in the Real WTI Price 
































NOTES: Risks are defined in terms of the event that the price of oil (in 2009.12 dollars) exceeds 80 dollars or falls below 45 dollars. 
For further discussion of these risk measures see Kilian and Manganelli (2007).96 
 
Table 1a: Predictability from Selected Nominal U.S. Aggregates to the Nominal Price of Oil 
(p-values of the Wald test statistic for Granger Non-Causality) 
 Evaluation  Period: 
 1973.2-2009.12 1975.2-2009.12 
Monthly 
Predictors: 








0.004  0.108  0.021  0.320 0.161 
M1 
 
0.181  0.039 0.010 0.000 0.000 
M2 
 
0.629 0.234 0.318 0.077  0.209 
CRB Industrial Raw 
Materials Index
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CRB Metals Index 
 
0.001 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.006 
3-Month  
T-Bill Rate 
0.409 0.712 0.880 0.799 0.896 
Trade-Weighted 
Exchange Rate 
-  0.740 0.724 0.575 0.746 
 
NOTES: Boldface indicates significance at the 10% level. RAC stands for U.S. refiners’ acquisition cost and CRB for the Commodity 
Research Bureau. All variables but the interest rate are expressed in percent changes. In some cases, one needs to consider the 
possibility of cointegration in levels. All rejections above remain significant if we follow Dolado and Lütkepohl (1996) in conducting 
a lag-augmented Granger non-causality test. All test results are based on bivariate VAR(12) models. Similar results are obtained with 
bivariate VAR(24) models.97 
 
Table 1b: Predictability from Selected Bilateral Nominal Dollar Exchange Rates to the Nominal Price of Oil 
(p-values of the Wald test statistic for Granger Non-Causality) 
 Evaluation  Period: 
 1973.1-2009.12 1975.2-2009.12 
Monthly 
Predictors: 








0.038 0.066 0.073 0.017 0.044 
Canada  
 
0.004 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.002 
New Zealand 
 
0.128 0.291 0.309 0.045  0.169 
South Africa 
 
0.017 0.020 0.052 0.021 0.037 
 
NOTES: Boldface indicates significance at the 10% level. RAC stands for U.S. refiners’ acquisition cost. All variables are expressed 
in percent changes. All test results are based on bivariate VAR(12) models. 98 
 
Table 2: Predictability from Selected Real Aggregates to the Real Price of Oil 
(p-values of the Wald test statistic for Granger Non-Causality) 
 Evaluation  Period: 
 1973.I-2009.IV  1975.II-2009.IV 
Quarterly 
Predictors: 


















HP  0.253 0.821 0.653 0.430 0.573 
DIF  0.493 0.948 0.705 0.418 0.578 
World Industrial 
Production
1        
LT
  0.032 0.095 0.141  0.081 0.098 
HP
  0.511 0.766 0.800 0.665 0.704 
DIF  0.544 0.722 0.772 0.668 0.691 
NOTES: Boldface indicates significance at the 10% level. LT denotes linear detrending, HP denotes HP filtering with smoothing 
parameter 1600,   and DIF denotes first differencing. RAC stands for U.S. refiners’ acquisition cost. All test results are based on 
bivariate VAR(4) models. Similar results are obtained with bivariate VAR(8) models. In the baseline specification the real price of oil 
is expressed in log levels. Similar results are obtained when both variables are detrended by the same method.  
1 Data source: U.N. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. These data end in 2008.III because the U.N. has temporarily suspended updates of 
this series, resulting in a shorter evaluation period. 99 
 
Table 3: Predictability from Selected Real Aggregates to the Real Price of Oil 
(p-values of the Wald test statistic for Granger Non-Causality) 
 Evaluation  Period: 
 1973.1-2009.12 1976.2-2009.12 
 
Monthly 











0.823    0.951 
 
0.735   0.952 
 
0.881   0.998 
 
0.707   0.979 
 
0.784   0.995 
U.S. Industrial 
Production 
      
LT  0.411    0.633  0.370   0.645  0.410   0.746  0.091   0.421    0.182   0.510   
HP  0.327    0.689  0.357   0.784  0.415   0.878  0.110   0.549  0.194   0.668   
DIF  0.533    0.859  0.458   0.866  0.473   0.909  0.114   0.490  0.222   0.699   
OECD+6 Industrial 
Production
1        
LT
  0.028    0.001  0.009   0.033  0.023   0.199  0.021   0.187  0.018   0.230 
HP
  0.195    0.034  0.072   0.278  0.138   0.714  0.121   0.530  0.114   0.706 
DIF  0.474    0.060  0.130   0.353  0.182   0.741  0.174   0.604  0.209   0.757 
Global Real Activity 
Index
2   
0.041    0.000 
 
0.055   0.020 
 
0.141   0.034 
 
0.004   0.004 
 
0.028   0.018 
NOTES: Boldface indicates significance at the 10% level. LT denotes linear detrending, HP denotes HP filtering with smoothing 
parameter 129600   (see Ravn and Uhlig 2002), and DIF denotes first differencing. The CFNAI and the global real activity index are 
constructed to be stationary. RAC stands for U.S. refiners’ acquisition cost. All test results are based on bivariate VAR(p) models. In 
the baseline specification the real price of oil is expressed in log levels. Similar results are obtained when both variables are detrended 
by the same method.   
1 Data source: OECD Main Economic Indicators.   
2 Data source: Updated version of the index developed in Kilian (2009a).100 
 
Table 4: 1-Month Ahead Forecast Error Diagnostics for Nominal WTI Price of Oil 
 
1| ˆ




t S   20.325 N.A. 
(1)
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CRB ind




,, ( 1 ) (1 )
CRB met




NOTES: All MSPE results are presented as ratios relative to the benchmark no-change forecast model, for which we 
report the level of the MSPE. The forecast evaluation period is 1991.1-2009.12. The initial estimation window is 
1986.1-1990.12. For regressions based on 6-month futures prices the estimation window begins in 1983.10; for the 9-
month futures price in 1986.12; for the 12-month futures price in 1989.1.  () h
t F is the futures price that matures in h 
periods;  , tm i  is the m month interest rate;  t s   is the percent change in  t S in the most recent month; and  () h
t s   is the 
percent change in the spot price over the most recent h months.  All p-values refer to pairwise tests of the null of 
equal predictive accuracy with the no-change forecast. Comparisons of nonnested models without estimated 
parameters are based on the DM-test of Diebold and Mariano (1995) using N(0,1) critical values; p-values for other 
nonnested comparisons are obtained by bootstrapping the loss differential. Nested model comparisons with estimated 
parameters are obtained by bootstrapping the DM-test statistic as in Clark and McCracken (2005) and Clark and West 
(2006, 2007). The success ratio is defined as the fraction of forecasts that correctly predict the sign of the change in 
the price of oil. The sign test in the last column is based on Pesaran and Timmermann (2009).  This test cannot be 
applied when there is no variability in the predicted sign. In such cases the p-value is reported as N.A.101 
 
Table 5: 3-Month Ahead Forecast Error Diagnostics for Nominal WTI Price of Oil 
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t S   95.451 N.A. 
(3)
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NOTES: See Table 4. 
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Table 6: 6-Month Ahead Forecast Error Diagnostics for Nominal WTI Price of Oil 
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t S   222.28 N.A. 
(6)
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NOTES: See Table 4. 
 103 
 
Table 7: 9-Month Ahead Forecast Error Diagnostics for Nominal WTI Price of Oil 
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t S   282.32 N.A. 
(9)
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NOTES: See Table 4. 104 
 
Table 8: 12-Month Ahead Forecast Error Diagnostics for Nominal WTI Price of Oil 
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t S   302.54 N.A. 
(12)
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Table 9: Short-Horizon Forecasts of the Nominal WTI Price of Oil from Daily Oil Futures Prices since January 1986 
 
  Start of evaluation period: January 1986 
  1 h    3 h    6 h    9 h    12 h   
  MSPE SR MSPE SR MSPE SR MSPE SR MSPE SR 
() h





















NOTES: There are 5968, 5926, 5861, 5744, and 5028 daily observations at horizons of 1 through 12 months, respectively. Following 
Leamer’s (1978) rule for adjusting the threshold for statistical significance with changes in the sample size, p-values below about 







Table 10: Long-Horizon Forecasts of the Nominal WTI Price of Oil from 


















NOTES: Following Leamer’s (1978) rule for adjusting the threshold  
for statistical significance with changes in the sample size, p-values  
below 0.0044 for a horizon of two years are considered statistically  
significant and are shown in boldface. 






















































Table 11: Accuracy of Survey Forecasts Relative to No-Change Forecast 
 
 














th t t h SS     1.519 0.447 0.944 0.539  - - 
|, ˆ EIA
th t t h SS     0.918  0.417 0.973 0.562  - - 
,
|, ˆ gasoline gasoline MSC
th t t h PP     - - - -  0.765  0.907
1
|, ˆ (1 )
MSC
th t t t h SS      - -  1.047  0.566
1 - - 
|, ˆ (1 )
SPF
th t t t h SS      - -  1.016  0.579
1 0.855  0.811
1
 
NOTES: Boldface indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.
1 No significance test possible due to lack of variation in success 
ratio. MSC denotes the Michigan Survey of Consumers, SPF the Survey of Professional Forecasters, EIA the Energy Information 
Administration and CE denotes Consensus Economics Inc.  , th   stands for the expected inflation rate between t and  . th 107 
 
Table 12: Recursive Forecast Error Diagnostics for the Real Price of Oil from Selected AR and ARMA Models 
U.S. Refiners’ Acquisition Cost for Imported Crude Oil 
 
  Evaluation period: 1991.12-2009.8 
  1 h    3 h    6 h    9 h    12 h   














































































































































































































NOTES: ARI and ARIMA, respectively, denote AR and ARMA models in log differences. The SIC and AIC are implemented with an 
upper bound of 12 lags. MSPE is expressed as a fraction of the MSPE of the no-change forecast. SR stands for success ratio. The p-
values for the sign test are computed following Pesaran and Timmermann (2009); those for the test of equal MSPEs are computed by 
bootstrapping the VAR model under the null, adapting the bootstrap algorithm in Kilian (1999). 
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Table 13: Recursive Forecast Error Diagnostics for the Real Price of Oil from Selected Unrestricted VAR Models 
U.S. Refiners’ Acquisition Cost for Imported Crude Oil 
 
    Evaluation period: 1991.12-2009.8 
Model:    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
p   h  MSPE SR  MSPE SR  MSPE SR  MSPE SR  MSPE SR  MSPE SR 

















































































































































































































































NOTES: MSPE is expressed as a fraction of the MSPE of the no-change forecast. SR stands for success ratio. The p-values for the 
sign test are computed following Pesaran and Timmermann (2009); those for the test of equal MSPEs are computed by bootstrapping 
the VAR model under the null, adapting the bootstrap algorithm in Kilian (1999). Model (1) includes all four variables used in the 
VAR model of Kilian and Murphy (2010); model (2) excludes oil inventories; model (3) excludes both oil inventories and oil 
production; model (4) excludes real activity and oil production; model (5) excludes real activity and oil inventories; and model (6) 
excludes oil production.109 
 




  Evaluation period: 1991.12-2009.8 
  1 h    3 h    6 h    9 h    12 h   













































































































































































































   
NOTES: See Table 12.110 
 
Table 15: Recursive Forecast Error Diagnostics for the Real Price of Oil from Selected Unrestricted VAR Models 
WTI 
 
    Evaluation period: 1991.12-2009.8 
Model:    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
p   h  MSPE SR  MSPE SR  MSPE SR  MSPE SR  MSPE SR  MSPE SR 

















































































































































































































































NOTES: See Table 13.111 
 
Table 16: Recursive MSPE Ratios for the Real Price of Oil from Selected Bayesian VAR Models 
 
 
    Evaluation period: 1991.12-2009.8 
Model:    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
p   h  RAC WTI RAC WTI RAC WTI RAC WTI RAC WTI RAC WTI 
12 1  0.800 0.892 0.825 0.938 0.828 0.945 0.798 0.896  0.827 0.951 0.795 0.883 
 3  0.876  0.886  0.929 0.954 0.930 0.957 0.855 0.890 0.921 0.972 0.867 0.870 
 6  0.967  0.990  0.988 1.008 0.987 1.006 0.943 0.985 0.971 1.011 0.962 0.984 
 9  1.052  1.036 1.053 1.036 1.054 1.037 1.033 1.037 1.031 1.029 1.050 1.036 
 12  1.004  1.005 1.024 1.024 1.028 1.028 0.994 1.008 1.015 1.022 1.004 1.003 
24 1  0.801 0.894 0.826 0.939 0.828 0.947 0.800 0.902 0.829 0.952 0.795 0.886 
 3  0.883 0.875 0.939 0.945 0.944 0.948 0.860 0.877 0.924 0.958 0.876 0.859 
 6  0.993 0.990 1.012 1.007 1.015 1.000 0.955 0.980 0.970 0.991 0.991 0.986 
 9  1.095 1.038 1.093 1.034 1.096 1.032 1.044 1.028 1.028 1.005 1.097 1.037 
 12  1.059 1.002 1.073 1.016 1.078 1.018 1.016 1.010 1.026 1.008 1.058 0.998 
 
NOTES: The Bayesian VAR forecast relies on the data-based procedure proposed in Giannone, Lenza and Primiceri (2010) for 
selecting the optimal degree of shrinkage in real time. MSPE is expressed as a fraction of the MSPE of the no-change forecast.  
Boldface indicates MSPE ratios lower than for the corresponding unrestricted VAR forecasting model in Tables 12 and 14. RAC 
refers to the U.S. refiners’ acquisition cost for imported crude oil and WTI to the price of West Texas Intermediate crude oil. Model 
(1) includes all four variables used in the VAR model of Kilian and Murphy (2010); model (2) excludes oil inventories; model (3) 
excludes both oil inventories and oil production; model (4) excludes real activity and oil production; model (5) excludes real activity 
and oil inventories; and model (6) excludes oil production. 112 
 
Table 17: Recursive Forecast Error Diagnostics for the Real Price of Oil (by Country) 
 
 
    Evaluation period: 1991.12-2009.8 
    
    U.S. Refiners’ Acquisition Cost for Imported Crude Oil 
   1 h    3 h    6 h    9 h    12 h   
    MSPE SR MSPE SR MSPE SR MSPE SR  MSPE  SR 




























































               
   WTI 
  1 h    3 h    6 h    9 h    12 h   
    MSPE SR MSPE SR MSPE SR MSPE SR  MSPE  SR 





























































NOTES: All MSPE results have been normalized relative to the no-change forecast of the country in question. The sample period is 
the same as in Tables 11 and 13. The foreign real price is obtained by converting the U.S. real price at the real exchange rate.113 
 
Table 18: MSPE Ratios of Linear Autoregressive Models Relative to the AR(4) Benchmark Model 
Cumulative U.S. Real GDP Growth Rates 
 
  Real RAC Price of Imports  Nominal RAC Price of Imports 
Horizon  Oil Price Endogenous  Oil Price Exogenous  Oil Price Endogenous  Oil Price Exogenous 
1  1.09 1.09 1.10 1.10 
2  1.03 1.03 1.04 1.04 
3  0.99 0.98 1.00  0.99 
4  0.97 0.96 0.98 0.97 
5  0.96 0.95 0.97 0.95 
6  0.95 0.94 0.95 0.94 
7  0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 
8  0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 
 
NOTES: The benchmark model is an AR(4) for U.S. real GDP growth. The first alternative is a VAR(4) model for real GDP growth 
and the percent change in the price of oil that allows for unrestricted feedback from U.S. real GDP growth to the price of oil. The 
second alternative is a restricted VAR(4) model that treats the price of oil as exogenous. Boldface indicates gains in accuracy relative 





Table 19a: MSPE Ratios of Nonlinear Dynamic Models Relative to the AR(4) Benchmark Model 
Cumulative U.S. Real GDP Growth Rates  
  Real Refiners’ Acquisition Cost for Imported Crude Oil 
  Unrestricted Model (20)  Exogenous Model (21) 
Horizon  Mork Increase  Hamilton Net Increase  Mork Increase  Hamilton Net Increase 
    1 Year  3 Year    1 Year  3 Year 
1  1.51 1.59 1.26 1.50 1.59 1.26 
2  1.53 1.69 1.16 1.51 1.68 1.16 
3  1.41 1.69 1.10 1.40 1.67 1.10 
4  1.41 1.78 1.11 1.40 1.75 1.11 
5  1.42 1.90 1.25 1.39 1.87 1.26 
6  1.40 1.65 1.19 1.36 1.62 1.19 
7  1.41 1.46 1.13 1.36 1.42 1.12 
8  1.43 1.33 1.06 1.37 1.29 1.06 
       
  Nominal Refiners’ Acquisition Cost for Imported Crude Oil 
  Unrestricted Model (20)  Exogenous Model (21) 
Horizon  Mork Increase  Hamilton Net Increase  Mork Increase  Hamilton Net Increase 
    1 Year  3 Year    1 Year  3 Year 
1  1.12 1.20 1.09 1.12 1.20 1.09 
2 1.10  1.10  0.84  1.10 1.10 0.84 
3 1.04  1.18  0.88  1.04 1.17 0.88 
4 1.04  1.15  0.79  1.04 1.14 0.78 
5 1.05  1.23  0.91  1.04 1.21 0.90 
6 1.05  1.15  0.91  1.04 1.13 0.91 
7 1.05  1.06  0.91  1.04 1.05 0.89 
8 1.05  1.02  0.90  1.05 1.01 0.89 
 
NOTES: The benchmark model is an AR(4) for U.S. real GDP growth. The nonlinear dynamic models are described in the text. 
Boldface indicates gains in accuracy relative to benchmark model. The exogenous model suppresses feedback from lagged real GDP 
growth to the current price of oil.  115 
 
Table 19b: MSPE Ratios of Nonlinear Dynamic Models Relative to the AR(4) Benchmark Model 
Cumulative U.S. Real GDP Growth Rates  
  Real Refiners’ Acquisition Cost for Imported Crude Oil 
 Restricted  Model  (22)  Restricted Exogenous Model (23) 
Horizon  Mork Increase  Hamilton Net Increase  Mork Increase  Hamilton Net Increase 
    1 Year  3 Year    1 Year  3 Year 
1 1.14  1.12  0.91  1.14 1.12 0.91 
2 1.12  1.03  0.86  1.11 1.04 0.85 
3 1.07  1.10  0.90  1.07 1.09 0.90 
4 1.04  1.05  0.85  1.03 1.05 0.85 
5 1.03  1.07  0.88  1.02 1.07 0.88 
6 1.02  1.02  0.87  1.00 1.01 0.87 
7 1.02  0.97 0.86 1.00  0.95 0.85 
8 1.01  0.95 0.85 1.01  0.95 0.85 
       
  Nominal Refiners’ Acquisition Cost for Imported Crude Oil 
 Restricted  Model  (22)  Restricted Exogenous Model (23) 
Horizon  Mork Increase  Hamilton Net Increase  Mork Increase  Hamilton Net Increase 
    1 Year  3 Year    1 Year  3 Year 
1  1.12 1.12 1.01 1.12 1.11 1.01 
2 1.08  0.99 0.79 1.08  0.98 0.79 
3 1.04  1.03  0.81  1.04 1.03 0.81 
4 1.00  0.98 0.74 1.00  0.98 0.74 
5  0.99  1.03  0.85 0.99 1.02  0.85 
6  0.99 0.99 0.87 0.97 0.98 0.86 
7  0.98 0.94 0.86 0.97 0.93 0.85 
8  0.98 0.93 0.86 0.97 0.92 0.85 
 
NOTES: The benchmark model is an AR(4) for U.S. real GDP growth.  The nonlinear dynamic models are described in the text. 
Boldface indicates gains in accuracy relative to benchmark model. The restricted model suppresses feedback from lagged percent 
changes in the price of oil to current real GDP growth, as proposed by Hamilton (2003, 2010). The restricted exogenous model 
combines this restriction with that of exogenous oil prices, further increasing the parsimony of the model.  116 
 
  Table 20: MSPE Ratios for Cumulative U.S. Real GDP Growth Rate Relative to AR(4) Benchmark Model:   




   













NOTES:  To conserve space, we focus on the most accurate nonlinear forecasting models. The models are  
described in the text. Boldface indicates gains in accuracy relative to AR(4) benchmark model for real  
GDP growth. 
  
  Oil Price Series  1990.Q1-2010.Q2  1990.Q1-2007.Q4 
   Horizon  Horizon 
   1 h    4 h    1 h               4 h   
Real RAC  imports  0.91 0.85  1.11             1.71 
 RAC  composite  1.16 0.99  1.49             2.05 
 RAC  domestic  1.23 0.89  1.55             1.73 
 WTI  1.03 0.70  1.23             1.22 
  PPI  1.24  1.09   1.63             2.28 
        
Nominal RAC  imports  1.01  0.74  1.22             1.37 
 RAC  composite  1.26 0.82  1.58             1.54 
 RAC  domestic  1.23 0.80  1.50             1.40 
 WTI  0.92 0.66  1.02             1.08 
 PPI  1.23 0.88   1.59             1.78 